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INTRODUCTION
On May 31, 2010, in the early hours of the morning, Israeli
Defense Forces boarded and occupied a flotilla of six vessels
seventy-two nautical miles from the coast of Gaza. The flotilla
carried food and other supplies to Gaza, which was under a naval blockade. During the incident, nine passengers were killed
and several others wounded. In the aftermath, a key question
that emerged was what body of law applied to the incident?
Was it subject to human rights law, international humanitarian law, or some mix of the two?1
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1. SECRETARY-GENERAL’S PANEL OF INQUIRY ON THE 31 MAY 2010 FLOTILLA INCIDENT, REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL’S PANEL OF INQUIRY ON
THE 31 MAY 2010 FLOTILLA INCIDENT, at 97 (July 2011), http://www.un.org/
News/dh/infocus/middle_east/Gaza_Flotilla_Panel_Report.pdf (noting, in discussing the issue, that “[t]here has been considerable legal debate on the precise nature of the relationship between these two legal regimes,” and that
“[ p]ositions taken in academic writing range from complete separation to complementarity and even fusion”). Hereinafter, this Article uses the term “humanitarian law” to refer to what is often termed “international humanitarian
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This same question has been at the heart of ongoing debates over the counter-terrorism operations of the United
States in the wake of September 11, 2001. There was relatively
little discussion of the relationship between human rights law
and humanitarian law in the U.S. government before the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, because the issue did not
often arise. On those few occasions that it did arise, the government’s position was far from consistent. In 1970, the U.S.
government supported U.N. General Assembly resolutions calling for compliance with human rights obligations during armed
conflicts.2 In 1984, however, the United States made clear its
view that the Convention Against Torture—a core human
rights treaty—was inapplicable during armed conflict.3 The
United States appeared to switch positions yet again when it
adopted the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights in 1992 without adding a similar disclaimer.4
law” or “the law of armed conflict”—the law that regulates the conduct of
armed conflicts found in the 1949 Geneva Conventions and related protocols,
treaties, case law, and customary international law.
2. In 1970, the General Assembly adopted five resolutions on the subject
of human rights in armed conflict, including one co-sponsored by the United
States on the humane treatment of prisoners of war, urging “strict compliance
with the provisions of existing international instruments concerning human
rights in armed conflicts.” G.A. Res. 2676 (XXV), U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., U.N.
Doc. A/RES/2676, at 77 (Dec. 9, 1970); see also Airgram from the Department
of State to Certain Posts (Aug. 12, 1971), in 5 FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE
UNITED STATES, 1969–1972, at 177, 187 (Evan M. Duncan, ed., 2004). Another
unanimous resolution (not including eight abstentions) issued the same day
stated: “Fundamental human rights, as accepted in international law and laid
down in international instruments, continue to apply fully in situations of
armed conflict.” G.A. Res. 2675 (XXV), U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., U.N. Doc.
A/RES/2675, at 76 (Dec. 9, 1970) (voting record available at http://www.un.org/
en/ga/documents/voting.asp).
3. Rep. of the Working Grp. on a Draft Convention Against Torture &
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Comm’n on
Human Rights, 40th Sess., ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1984/72 (Mar. 9, 1984) (arguing that “the convention . . . was never intended to apply to armed conflicts
and thus supersede the 1949 Geneva Conventions on humanitarian law in
armed conflicts and the 1977 Protocols additional thereto”).
4. The decision was all the more striking because the Human Rights
Committee had made clear its view that the Convention was applicable during
armed conflict. See Françoise J. Hampson, The Relationship Between International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law from the Perspective of a
Human Rights Treaty Body, 90 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 549, 550 n.5 (2008). It is
of course possible that the United States regarded a reservation as unnecessary because it did not believe the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights would apply extraterritorially. But it is also possible to interpret the
decision to suggest U.S. acceptance of the idea that some human rights norms
applied during times of armed conflict.
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After the devastating terrorist attacks on September 11,
2001, the question became much more pressing. The ongoing
wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and extensive detainee operations, have turned questions that were once a hypothetical possibility into real legal dilemmas.5 In 2010, U.S. Department of
State Legal Adviser Harold Koh appeared before the American
Society of International Law to reaffirm that all relevant laws
of war apply even to detainees earlier deemed “enemy combatant[s].”6 He emphasized that, “as a matter of international law,
this Administration has expressly acknowledged that international law informs the scope of our detention authority.”7 He also argued that targeting decisions comply with “all applicable
law, including the laws of war.”8 Yet Koh left unaddressed a
5. State Department Legal Adviser John Bellinger faced these issues in
his appearance before the Committee Against Torture in 2006. John B.
Bellinger, III, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep’t of State, Opening Remarks at U.S.
Meeting with U.N. Committee Against Torture (May 5, 2006), available at
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/68557.htm; see Memorandum from the Government of the United States of America (Mar. 10, 2006) available at http://
www.asil.org/pdfs/ilib0603212.pdf (reply to the Report of the Five UNCHR
Special Rapporteurs on Detainees in Guantanamo Bay); see also Memorandum
from the U.S. Dep’t of State to the U.N. Committee Against Torture (Apr. 28,
2006), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/68662.pdf
(response to questions asked by the committee against torture). Bellinger explained that “[i]t is the view of the United States that these detention operations are governed by the law of armed conflict, which is the lex specialis applicable to those operations.” Bellinger, supra. The current legal adviser has
also addressed these issues. Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep’t of
State, Address at the Annual Meeting of the American Society of Int’l Law
(Mar. 25, 2010), available at http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/
139119.htm (“[ W ]e continue to fight a war of self-defense against an enemy
that attacked us on September 11, 2001, and before, and that continues to undertake armed attacks against the United States.”).
6. Koh, supra note 5 (“Let there be no doubt: the Obama Administration
is firmly committed to complying with all applicable law, including the laws of
war, in all aspects of these ongoing armed conflicts . . . . We in the Obama
Administration have worked hard since we entered office to ensure that we
conduct all aspects of these armed conflicts—in particular, detention operations, targeting, and prosecution of terrorist suspects—in a manner consistent
not just with the applicable laws of war, but also with the Constitution and
laws of the United States.”); see also Respondents’ Memorandum Regarding
the Gov’t’s Detention Auth. Relative to Detainees Held at Guantanamo Bay at
1, In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litig., 581 F. Supp. 2d 33 (D.D.C. 2008)
(No. 08-442) (“The detention authority conferred by the AUMF is necessarily
informed by principles of the laws of war.”).
7. Koh, supra note 5.
8. Id.; see also Respondents’ Memorandum Regarding the Government’s
Detention Auth. Relative to Detainees Held at Guantanamo Bay, supra note 6
(“The detention authority conferred by the AUMF is necessarily informed by
principles of the laws of war.”).
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key legal question: Which law governs during armed conflict—
human rights law or humanitarian law?
This Article aims to answer that question. It considers the
relationship between human rights law and humanitarian law
in the context of armed conflict and occupation. It draws on jurisprudence, state practice, and recent scholarship to describe
three central approaches to applying the two bodies of law, to
offer a recommendation as to which of the approaches provides
the best guide to reconciling conflicts between the two bodies of
law, and to explain the stakes of that choice.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I addresses a
threshold question: under what conditions does each body of
law potentially apply? This Part outlines methods for determining when an armed conflict or occupation situation exists, since
armed conflict and occupation activate humanitarian law.9 It
then examines territorial sovereignty and the emerging effectivecontrol standard for the extraterritorial application of human
rights as prerequisites for the application of human rights law.
Part II identifies three theoretical approaches to the relationship between the two bodies of law. First is the Displacement Model. The Displacement Model has the virtue of simplicity: During an armed conflict, humanitarian law displaces
human rights law. When no armed conflict exists, human
rights law displaces humanitarian law. Second is the Complementarity Model. Complementarity is relatively simple in theory, though substantially more complicated in practice. In the
Complementarity Model, as in all the models, when there is no
armed conflict, only human rights law applies. When there is
an armed conflict, however, human rights law and humanitarian law are applied and interpreted harmoniously. The two bodies of law thus have what this Article terms a “relationship of
interpretation.” Third is the Conflict Resolution Model. In the
Conflict Resolution Model, when an armed conflict is present,
the decision maker must evaluate the relationship between
human rights law and humanitarian law. If they are, in fact,
complementary, then both are applied. If they conflict, however, the model offers three possible decision rules—event-specific
displacement, reverse event-specific displacement, and specificity—for deciding the appropriate body of law to be applied.

9. For the sake of simplicity, most of this Article refers only to “armed
conflict,” though the legal analysis applies to both armed conflict and occupation.
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Part II concludes with a detailed discussion of the specificity-decision rule variation of the Conflict Resolution Model. Under this decision rule, in situations of conflict between relevant
human rights law and humanitarian law, the law more specific
to the particular situation should govern. This Part also describes a number of factors that aid in determining which body
of law is more specific to a given situation. The specificity rule
of conflict resolution that we detail derives from the broader lex
specialis maxim, which states that “whenever two or more
norms deal with the same subject matter, priority should be
given to the norm that is more specific.”10 However, the specificity rule applies at the level of the operation, situation, or encounter, so that whichever body of law is eclipsed in that operation, situation, or encounter still remains relevant in the
broader armed conflict.
Part III argues for the specificity rule variation of the Conflict Resolution Model—and shows how that rule would operate. This rule offers a legally and morally defensible approach
to the question of which law governs during armed conflict. It
recognizes that both bodies of law can productively inform each
other when they do not squarely conflict, yet allows for highly
nuanced determinations as to when conduct is governed best by
each body of law when conflict is unavoidable. Above all, the
approach recognizes that total abrogation of human rights law
in a zone of armed conflict is too blunt an instrument to accomplish the most basic goal common to both human rights law and
humanitarian law: to effectively protect fundamental human
dignity.
Part IV applies the theoretical discussion of Parts II and
III to examples of conduct governed by both bodies of law. It
examines situations in which conflicts actually exist between
the two and considers how they might be approached. Square
conflicts between the two bodies of law can be found in situations of armed conflict when human rights law regarding the
right to life; detention and the right to trial; women’s rights;
and the rights to freedom of expression, association, and
movement is implicated. To take just the right to life, humanitarian law permits state agents to intentionally kill combatants
and incidentally kill civilians (within clearly proscribed limits)
in circumstances that human rights law does not countenance.
At bottom, therefore, human rights law and humanitarian law
10. Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n, 58th Sess., May 1–June 9, July 3–Aug.
11, 2006, at 408, U.N. Doc. A/61/10 (2006).
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give fundamentally different answers to the question of when
state agents can use lethal force. The same is true of each of
these conflicts between the two bodies of law, thus making
plain the high stakes of the answer to the question of which law
governs—and the pressing need to address it.
Finally, this Article concludes with a call to a renewed and
robust debate over which law governs during armed conflict.
This issue is more pressing today than ever before. Human
rights jurisprudence is placing greater obligations on states acting outside their own territory, and modern warfare is rarely
limited to the traditional “battlefield.” Conflict between humanitarian law and human rights law is therefore inevitable, and
finding a way to resolve this conflict is essential to the continued vitality of both bodies of law.
I. WHEN DOES EACH BODY OF LAW APPLY?
Before we examine the relationship between human rights
law and humanitarian law, we first must ask when each body
of law applies to a given situation. After all, choosing between
the two bodies of law requires that either body of law could potentially apply. Yet each body of law has rules governing
whether it is applicable to a given situation—rules that are
completely independent of any conflict between them. This Part
offers an overview of when each body of law applies. This provides the necessary background for the next Part, which considers the options for resolving conflicts that arise between the
two bodies of law when both might apply to a given situation.
A. WHEN DOES INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW APPLY?
Humanitarian law applies only in situations of armed conflict; hence the applicability of this body of law turns on whether an armed conflict or occupation exists. The fundamental
question of when an armed conflict or occupation exists may
appear on its face quite simple and obvious, but in reality is extraordinarily complex. Here we sketch the key legal principles
that are generally used to answer this question.
We begin briefly with how to identify the existence of an
“occupation.” Article 42 of the 1907 Hague Convention provides: “Territory is considered occupied when it is actually
placed under the authority of the hostile army. The occupation
extends only to the territory where such authority has been es-
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tablished and can be exercised.”11 Article 43 similarly speaks of
the “authority of the legitimate power having in fact passed into the hands of the occupant . . . .”12 In addition, Common Article 2 of the Geneva Conventions provides that the Conventions
“shall apply to all cases of partial or total occupation of the territory of a High Contracting Party, even if the said occupation
meets with no armed resistance.”13 It is clear that an occupation ends when the occupying power withdraws its forces from
the territory in question. There is some controversy over
whether an occupation ends when the government of the territory formally consents to the continued presence of foreign
troops or whether some level of effective authority must be
transferred as well.14
Identifying the existence of an armed conflict is markedly
more challenging—and has become more so in recent years
with the decreasing frequency of traditional “battlefield” conflicts and the proliferation of non-state armed actors with a
cross-national presence, like al-Qaeda. Among the most comprehensive recent efforts to define armed conflict is the International Law Association’s Final Report on the Meaning of
Armed Conflict in International Law.15 After the initiation of
the “war on terror,” the Executive Committee of the International Law Association “was asked to . . . report on how international law defines and distinguishes situations of armed conflict and those situations in which peacetime law prevails.”16
The Committee found that, today:
Declarations of war or armed conflict, national legislation, expressions of subjective intent by parties to a conflict, and the like, may
have evidentiary value but such expressions do not alone create a de
jure state of war or armed conflict . . . . The de jure state or situation

11. Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, art.
42, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 1 Bevans 631.
12. Id. art. 43.
13. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War,
art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter GC III].
14. See Siobhán Wills, The Obligations Due to Former “Protected Persons”
in Conflicts that Have Ceased to Be International, 15 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY
L. 117, 131–33 (2010) (describing contemporary debates over the meaning of
occupation under international law).
15. INT’L LAW ASS’N, FINAL REPORT ON THE MEANING OF ARMED CONFLICT IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2010), available at http://www.ila-hq.org/en/
committees/index.cfm/cid/1022.
16. Id. at 1.
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of armed conflict depends on the presence of actual and observable
facts, in other words, objective criteria.17

While “the Committee found no widely accepted definition
of armed conflict in any treaty, . . . [i]t did . . . discover significant evidence in the sources of international law that the international community embraces a common understanding of
armed conflict.”18 The two characteristics the Committee identified as common to all armed conflict were, first, “[t]he existence
of organized armed groups” and, second, that the groups are
“[e]ngaged in fighting of some intensity.”19
The Committee report drew on, among a diverse array of
other sources, the frequently cited 1995 decision of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in Prosecutor v. Tadić, which also pointed to two factors—organization of
armed groups and intensity of fighting—as the defining characteristics of armed conflict.20 Of course, what constitutes a sufficiently organized armed group and what counts as sufficient intensity of fighting are issues not fully settled by this case or
any other single source.
Even when it is clear that an armed conflict exists, there is
often a further question of whether the conflict is an international armed conflict (IAC) or a noninternational armed conflict
(NIAC). Identifying the type of armed conflict is an important
step in selecting the international humanitarian instruments
17. Id. at 33. Common Article 2 of the Geneva Conventions similarly provides that “the present Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or
of any other armed conflict which may arise . . . .” GC III, supra note 13, art. 2.
18. INT’L LAW ASS’N, supra note 15, at 1.
19. Id. at 2. It should be noted that the ICRC commentary on Common
Article 2 can be read to adopt a lower threshold for the existence of an armed
conflict:
Any difference arising between two States and leading to the intervention of armed forces is an armed conflict within the meaning of Article 2 . . . . It makes no difference how long the conflict lasts, or how
much slaughter takes place. The respect due to human personality is
not measured by the number of victims. Nor, incidentally, does the
application of the Convention necessarily involve the intervention of
cumbrous machinery. It all depends on circumstances. If there is only
a single wounded person as a result of the conflict, the Convention will
have been applied as soon as he has been collected and tended . . . .
1 INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY: GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12
AUGUST 1949, at 32 (Jean S. Pictet ed., 1952). The ICRC commentaries on the
other Geneva Conventions contain similar language.
20. Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94 -1-I, Decision on Defence Motion
for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 70 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995), available at http://www.iilj.org/courses/documents/
Prosecutorv. Tadić.pdf.
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and customary rules that apply.21 Recently, particularly in the
“war on terror” context, the line between international and noninternational armed conflict has blurred, and there have been
calls for a new common definition of armed conflict.22 Until that
happens, the factors outlined by the International Law Association and in the Tadić case will continue to provide the best
available guidance on the question of when an armed conflict
exists and therefore when humanitarian law applies.
B. WHEN DOES HUMAN RIGHTS LAW APPLY?
Compared to humanitarian law, human rights law is more
varied and stems from more diverse legal sources. There are
over one hundred different human rights treaties as well as
multiple customary international human rights norms that
govern state action.23 Human rights law addresses a wide
range of behavior and actions, including torture, genocide,
women’s rights, children’s rights, racial discrimination, and the
right to life, to name just a few.24
The immense variation in human rights law makes it difficult to provide a blanket characterization of its applicability.
For those areas of human rights law where there is a treaty
that is the key source of the legal rules governing state conduct,
the application of those rules is generally guided by that treaty
and authoritative interpretations of it. In these cases, the application of human rights law may be expressly limited by the
treaty itself—for example, it may be explicitly limited to the
geographic territory of the ratifying States or to particular
types of perpetrators. For those areas of human rights that derive from more diffuse sources or that have attained customary
21. Compare Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August
1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflict, arts. 51(3), 41, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter AP I], with
Protocol Additional (II) to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, art.
6(2), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter AP II]. See generally ICRC,
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 3–24 (Jean-Marie
Henckaerts & Louise Dorwald-Beck eds., 2005) (explaining the different rules
of customary international humanitarian law in international and
noninternational armed conflicts).
22. See James G. Stewart, Towards a Single Definition of Armed Conflict
in International Humanitarian Law: A Critique of Internationalized Armed
Conflict, 85 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 313, 344 –49 (2003).
23. See Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make A Difference?, 111 YALE L.J. 1935, 1937–41 (2002).
24. See id. at 1963–75.
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international law or jus cogens status, on the other hand, the
law may have comprehensive application.
There are, nonetheless, a few observations about the applicability of human rights law that are possible as a general
matter. Human rights law almost always applies at a minimum
within the territorial boundaries of the States that have ratified the relevant human rights treaties. This obligation has
long been widely accepted.25
As States have increasingly found themselves operating
outside their own territorial boundaries—including in the context of armed conflict and the “war on terror”—the question has
more frequently arisen whether human rights obligations apply
extraterritorially, particularly with respect to non-citizens. In
the past, representatives of the United States have taken the
position that such obligations—including those under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the
Convention Against Torture—do not apply extraterritorially.26
25. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 2(1), Dec.
16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR] (obligating members “to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the
rights recognized in the present Covenant”); Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948), available at http://www.ohchr.org/EN/UDHR/Documents/UDHR_Translations/eng.pdf
(“[E]very individual and every organ of society . . . shall strive . . . to promote
respect for these rights and freedoms . . . both among the peoples of Member
States themselves and among the peoples of territories under their
jurisdiction.”).
26. See, e.g., Bellinger, supra note 5 (“As a general matter, countries negotiating the Convention [Against Torture] were principally focused on dealing
with rights to be afforded to people through the operation of ordinary domestic
legal processes . . . . ”); Letter from Kevin Moley, Permanent Representative of
the U.S. to the U.N. & Other Int’l Orgs. in Geneva, to the Office of the High
Comm’r for Human Rights (Jan. 31, 2006), reprinted as U.N. High Comm’n on
Human Rights, Rep. of the Chairperson-Rapporteur of the Working Group on
Arbitrary Detention et al. on the Situation of Detainees at Guantanamo Bay,
Annex II, E/CN.4/2006/120 (Feb. 27, 2006) (“The United States has made clear
its position that . . . the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
by its express terms, applies only to ‘individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction’ [and not, e.g., to detainees outside the territorial
U.S.].”), available at http://www.essex.ac.uk/human_rights_centre/research/
rth/docs/GBAY.pdf. The United States’s fourth periodic report required under
the ICCPR did not reject or accept the extraterritorial application of the Convention; it was, instead, silent on the matter. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE,
FOURTH PERIODIC REPORT OF THE U.S. TO THE UNITED NATIONS COMMITTEE
ON HUMAN RIGHTS CONCERNING THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL
AND POLITICAL RIGHTS (Dec. 30, 2011), available at http://www.state.gov/
j/drl/rls/179781.htm. In light of the Committee’s position that the Convention
does have extraterritorial effect, this silence might be seen as a move toward
acceptance of extraterritorial effect. Nonetheless, it is premature to know with
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Today there is growing consensus among international
bodies and foreign States that human rights law obligations
apply abroad wherever a State exercises “effective control” over
territory or individuals outside its borders.27 This standard has
been articulated slightly differently by different bodies, including the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, the
U.N. Human Rights Committee, the Committee Against Torture, the International Court of Justice (ICJ), and the European Court of Human Rights, as well as various national courts.28
Although the specific legal formulations are different, the basic
message is similar across all of these regimes: control, rather
than territorial sovereignty, defines the outer limits of human
rights law obligations.29 That principle, which is gaining growing acceptance in the international arena, may suggest much
broader applicability for at least some human rights law than
has been traditionally assumed—particularly in the United
States. That, in turn, will give rise to increasing conflict between humanitarian law and human rights law during armed
conflict. We turn next to exploring three different models for
resolving this conflict between the two bodies of law.
II. THREE MODELS FOR RESOLVING THE CONFLICT
There have been many efforts to make sense of the relationship between humanitarian law and human rights law.
Here we categorize these efforts into three distinct models for
certainty if this apparent softening on the part of the United States will have
any legal consequences.
27. See Sarah H. Cleveland, Embedded International Law and the Constitution Abroad, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 225, 229 (2010) (“Regional human rights
tribunals, the U.N. treaty bodies, and the International Court of Justice (ICJ)
all have recognized that human rights obligations travel with a state when a
state or its agents place persons or territories under the state’s ‘effective control.’”); Oona A. Hathaway, et al., Human Rights Abroad: When Do Human
Rights Treaty Obligations Apply Extraterritorially?, 43 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 389, 395–
420 (2010) (examining international and foreign case law regarding the extension of human rights obligations outside a state’s borders).
28. See Cleveland, supra note 27, at 248–70; Hathaway et al., supra note
27, at 404 –20.
29. See Cleveland, supra note 27, at 269 (“Whether one employs the ‘authority and control’ test of the Inter-American system, the ‘power of effective
control’ standard of the Human Rights Committee and the International Court
of Justice, the ‘de facto and de jure effective control’ of the Committee Against
Torture—all of which apply to control over either persons or territories . . . or
the more territorially-constrained conception of ‘control’ of the ECHR, control,
rather than geography, is the touchstone for the recognition of rights protections abroad.”) (emphasis in original)).
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resolving conflicts between the two bodies of law in situations
of armed conflict: the Displacement Model, the Complementarity Model, and the Conflict Resolution Model. The models discussed herein are not formal rules of decision that different
courts and governments have expressly adopted. Rather, they
represent an attempt to classify the diverse approaches that
tribunals, States, practitioners, and scholars have used or advocated into three analytically distinct categories. This effort to
classify existing approaches must be tempered by a recognition
that cases in the real world do not always fit neatly within a
single model. For that reason, this discussion also notes cases
that include language that might be read to support more than
one model or that might be read differently in light of the different models.
A. THE DISPLACEMENT MODEL
The Displacement Model provides that whenever there is
an armed conflict, humanitarian law displaces human rights
law. Defining the zone of armed conflict is thus the first and
last step for determining the appropriate body of law in the
Displacement Model. If the conduct occurs within the zone of
armed conflict, humanitarian law governs exclusively and displaces any human rights law that might otherwise apply. If the
conduct is outside that zone, human rights law remains operative. Displacement models may vary in their definition of
armed conflict, making the field for application of humanitarian law larger or smaller, but the basic tradeoff remains the
same. Figure 1 illustrates the decision-making process under
the Displacement Model.
Figure 1
Displacement Model

Does the conduct occur within a zone of
armed conflict?

YES
International
Humanitarian
Law

NO
Human Rights
Law
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This approach is labeled “displacement” because humanitarian law is understood to displace human rights law entirely
during armed conflict.30 The premise underlying this approach
is that countries developed humanitarian law to replace the
norms controlling peacetime behavior, due to the demands of
military necessity and the limitations of control during armed
conflict.31 In this model, lex specialis is determined at the level
of the armed conflict—humanitarian law is the lex specialis for
all conduct within the entire zone of an armed conflict. In this
respect it differs markedly from the “event-specific displacement” rule of decision (discussed in Part III.C.1 below), which
similarly operates to displace human rights law, but on the
much smaller scale of a single event, operation, or situation.
Proponents of the displacement approach rely on an aggressive reading of the ICJ’s Nuclear Weapons advisory opinion.32 The ICJ wrote:
In principle, the right not arbitrarily to be deprived of one’s life [codified in Article 6 of the ICCPR] applies also in hostilities. The test of
what is an arbitrary deprivation of life, however, then falls to be determined by the applicable lex specialis, namely, the law applicable in
armed conflict which is designed to regulate the conduct of hostilities.
Thus whether a particular loss of life, through the use of a certain
weapon in warfare, is to be considered an arbitrary deprivation of life
contrary to Article 6 of the [ICCPR], can only be decided by reference
to the law applicable in armed conflict and not deduced from the
terms of the [ICCPR] itself.33

The Displacement Model emphasizes the qualifying “in principle” of the first sentence of this quote and the definitive “only”
of the final sentence.34 In other words, it concludes that during
hostilities, the only law relevant to determining whether a par30. Memorandum from Tom Dannenbaum, The Interaction of International Human Rights Law and International Humanitarian Law with Respect
to Rights to Life and Liberty, as part of the Allard K. Lowenstein International Human Rights Clinic 7 (Dec. 17, 2009) (on file with authors) [hereinafter
Dannenbaum Memo].
31. Id. at 11; see Cordula Droege, The Interplay Between International
Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law in Situations of
Armed Conflict, 40 ISR. L. REV. 310, 347 (2007). But see David Kretzmer, Rethinking Application of IHL in Non-International Armed Conflicts, 42 ISR. L.
REV. 1, 23–31 (2009) (arguing that, with the advent of the modern human
rights regime, humanitarian law is anachronistic and unnecessary except in
situations of extreme violence).
32. See Dannenbaum Memo, supra note 30, at 5–6.
33. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion,
1996 I.C.J. 226, ¶ 25 (July 8), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/
95/7495.pdf.
34. See Dannenbaum Memo, supra note 30, at 12.
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ticular loss of life constitutes an “arbitrary deprivation of life”
is the law of armed conflict.35
The United States government has at times articulated arguments that could be read to reflect the Displacement Model,
downplaying the role of human rights law in armed conflict—
particularly in the “global war on terror” context.36 The Israeli
Government has also at times advocated the displacement approach, specifically by denying the applicability of human
rights law to the Occupied Territories:
Israel denies that the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, both of which it has signed, are applicable to the occupied Palestinian territory. It asserts that humanitarian law is the
protection granted in a conflict situation such as the one in the West
Bank and Gaza Strip, whereas human rights treaties were intended
for the protection of citizens from their own Government in times of
peace.37

It takes this position not only because it rejects the extraterritorial application of human rights law,38 but also because it
characterizes the situation in the Occupied Territories as one of
ongoing armed conflict.39
Aside from the U.S. and Israeli governments, there are few
express adherents to the Displacement Model in the interna35. See id.
36. See Bellinger, supra note 5 (“It is the view of the United States
that . . . detention operations [in Guantánamo, Afghanistan, and Iraq] are
governed by the law of armed conflict, which is the lex specialis applicable to
those operations.”); Memorandum from the Government of the United States
of America, supra note 5.; Memorandum from the U.S. Dep’t of State to the
U.N. Committee Against Torture, supra note 5; see also Nancie Prud’homme,
Lex Specialis: Oversimplifying a More Complex and Multifaceted Relationship?, 40 ISR. L. REV. 356, 358 (2007).
37. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, ¶ 102 (July 9).
38. See U.N. Human Rights Comm., Second Periodic Rep. of Israel to the
Human Rights Comm., ¶ 8, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/ISR/2001/2 (Dec. 4, 2001) [hereinafter Second Periodic Report], available at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc
.nsf/%28Symbol%29/2cc0a33c394919e0c1256be9002e1188?Opendocument; see
also Cordula Droege, Elective Affinities? Human Rights and Humanitarian
Law, 90 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 501, 519 (2008) (describing Israel as having
“consistently objected to the extraterritorial application of human rights instruments”). But see HCJ 3239/02 Marab v. IDF Commander in the West
Bank 57 (2) PD 349 [2002] (Isr.). For a discussion of the extraterritorial application of human rights law, see supra Part II.B.
39. See Prud’homme, supra note 36, at 376 (stating that Israel has “reject[ed] the application of a number of human rights treaties in the Occupied
Territories on the basis that this situation was one pertaining to armed
conflict”).
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tional community. The bluntness of the approach, which denies
any role for human rights law during the course of an armed
conflict, has been regarded by most as inconsistent with a serious commitment to human rights law.40 The bluntness of the
model also prevents conflicts from being heard by legal bodies
with the greatest subject-matter expertise. If human rights law
is completely displaced and therefore inapplicable in the course
of armed conflict, then the human rights bodies that are
charged with overseeing States’ implementation of their human
rights obligations have no obligations to oversee. If a child is a
victim of violence during an armed conflict, for example, the
Displacement Model or event-specific displacement might prevent the international organization with the greatest expertise
in children’s rights—the Committee for the Rights of the
Child—from considering the violation. For if the Convention on
the Rights of the Child is completely displaced by humanitarian
law during armed conflict, there are no longer any treaty-based
“obligations” for the Committee to oversee.
The Displacement Model does, however, have the virtue of
simplicity. The other two models allow both bodies of law to
apply within the zone of armed conflict at various points. But
this raises the difficult question of when each body of law
should be applied to a given situation and how to resolve conflict between the two. The other two models—Complementarity
and Conflict Resolution—offer two different answers to this
question.
B. THE COMPLEMENTARITY MODEL
The Complementarity Model provides that both bodies of
law are applied and interpreted in concert with one another.
Sometimes called the “mutual elaboration” or “coordinated interpretation” approach,41 the model is grounded in the principle
that the two bodies of law are engaged in a common mission to
protect human life and dignity.42 It avoids the key weakness of
the displacement approach, because it provides that human
rights law can continue to offer guidance even when armed con40. See, e.g., INT’L LAW ASS’N, supra note 15, at 3.
41. Dannenbaum Memo, supra note 30, at 8.
42. See Jakob Kellenberger, President, Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross
(ICRC), Address at the 27th Annual Round Table on Current Problems of International Humanitarian Law (Sept. 6, 2003), available at http://www.icrc
.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/5rfgaz (“The common underlying purpose of international humanitarian law and international human rights law is the protection of the life, health and dignity of human beings.”).
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flict is triggered. Because it assumes the two bodies of law
share a common foundational mission, it views them not as lying in conflict but instead as complementary. The approach is
illustrated in Figure 2.
Figure 2
Complementarity Model
Does the conduct occur within a zone
of armed conflict?

YES
What is the relationship between the
relevant legal rules?

NO
HRL

Relationship of
Interpretation
HRL &
IHL

The Complementarity Model assumes that, in any instance
where both bodies of law apply, the laws can be interpreted in
such a way that they do not conflict—that is, the laws exhibit a
“relationship of interpretation.” Thus, the only operative question is whether there is an armed conflict (and thus whether
humanitarian law applies). If so, then that law is applied in
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conjunction with human rights law. If not, then only human
rights law applies.
The Complementarity Model relies on the authority of Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
(VCLT), which requires treaty parties interpreting their obligations to take into account “[a]ny relevant rules of international
law applicable in the relations between the parties.”43 As such,
humanitarian law provides rules relevant to the interpretation
of human rights law in times of armed conflict, while human
rights law can do the same for humanitarian law.44
The Complementarity Model suggests a different reading
of the ICJ’s Nuclear Weapons advisory opinion than that offered by advocates of the Displacement Model described in Part
II.A.45 In language that immediately precedes that quoted
above, the ICJ expressly states that the ICCPR applies in
hostilities:
[T]he protection of the International Covenant of Civil and Political
Rights does not cease in times of war, except by operation of Article 4
of the Covenant whereby certain provisions may be derogated from in
a time of national emergency. Respect for the right to life is not, however, such a provision.46

Advocates of the Complementarity Model hold the language to which the Displacement Model points, then, is better
read not as calling for displacing human rights law in favor of
humanitarian law but as using humanitarian law to inform the
interpretation of human rights law—in this case, the meaning
of an “arbitrary deprivation of life.”47
The ICJ’s Wall advisory opinion supports this reading of
the Nuclear Weapons opinion. The court explains that in the
Nuclear Weapons opinion, it had “rejected” the argument that
“the Covenant was directed to the protection of human rights in
peacetime, but that questions relating to unlawful loss of life in
hostilities were governed by the law applicable in armed con43. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 31, May 23, 1969,
1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
44. Dannenbaum Memo, supra note 30, at 8.
45. See supra notes 32–34 and accompanying text.
46. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion,
1996 I.C.J. 226, ¶ 25 (July 8); see also Vera Gowlland-Debbas, The Relevance
of Paragraph 25 of the ICJ’s Advisory Opinion on Nuclear Weapons, 98 AM.
SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 358, 359 (2004) (arguing that paragraph 25 of the Nuclear Weapons opinion “serves to reinforce the consistent trend in human rights
case law that the individual is entitled to both human rights and humanitarian law protection in complementary fashion in time of armed conflict”).
47. Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. ¶ 25.
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flict.”48 It states, “the Court considers that the protection offered by human rights conventions does not cease in case of
armed conflict, save through the effect of provisions for derogation.”49 Instead, “the Court will have to take into consideration
both these branches of international law, namely human rights
law and, as lex specialis, international humanitarian law.”50
The Complementarity Model is also reflected in General
Comments by the U.N. Human Rights Committee.51 The Committee stated the proposition directly in General Comment 31:
“While, in respect of certain Covenant rights, more specific rules
of international humanitarian law may be specially relevant for
the purposes of the interpretation of Covenant rights, both
spheres of law are complementary, not mutually exclusive.”52
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has
also been a leading advocate of this approach.53 Speaking before the 27th Annual Round Table on Current Problems of International Humanitarian Law, Jakob Kellenberger, President
of the ICRC, took the position that the bodies of law are “distinct but complementary.”54 Although acknowledging differences in the law—for example, that some human rights law requirements are derogable while humanitarian law is always
nonderogable—he maintained that these differences did not
render the bodies of law “mutually exclusive.”55
The recent jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights and the Inter-American Commission of Human
Rights is also most consistent with the Complementarity Model. Bámaca Velásquez represents the high-water mark of the
48. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, ¶ 105 (July 9) (quotation
omitted). See Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo
(Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), 2005 I.C.J. 168, ¶¶ 216–20 (Dec. 19); Construction of a Wall, 2004 I.C.J. ¶¶ 102–13.
49. Construction of a Wall, 2004 I.C.J. ¶ 106.
50. Id.
51. Dannenbaum Memo, supra note 30, at 8–9. See generally Human
Rights Comm., General Comment No. 31: The Nature of the General Legal
Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (May 26, 2004); Human Rights Comm., General
Comment No. 29: States of Emergency (Article 4), U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11 (Aug. 31, 2001).
52. General Comment No. 31: The Nature of the General Legal Obligation
Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, supra note 51, ¶ 11.
53. See Kellenberger, supra note 42.
54. Id.
55. Id.
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Inter-American Court’s application of the model.56 The InterAmerican Court explained: “the relevant provisions of the Geneva Convention may be taken into consideration as elements
for the interpretation of the American Convention.”57 Hence,
the American Convention—a human rights agreement—
remained fully operative and compatible with humanitarian
law during armed conflict.
In Coard v. United States, the Inter-American Commission
was more restrained. It held that “while international humanitarian law pertains primarily in times of war and the international law of human rights applies most fully in times of peace,
the potential application of one does not necessarily exclude or
displace the other.”58 The Commission then went on to note
that humanitarian law could help to define whether detention
was “arbitrary” under the terms of Articles I and XXV of the
American Declaration.59
The qualifying adverb “necessarily” illustrates a key weaknesses of the Complementarity Model: it is grounded in the assumption that conflicts between the two systems of law are always reconcilable through complementary interpretation.60 As
described in greater detail in Part IV, however, there are some
circumstances in which it is not possible to reconcile conflicts
between the two bodies of law in this way. One example is the
treatment of persons captured during armed conflict: humanitarian law specifies that “combatants” be held as POWs until
the end of hostilities (and then returned), while human rights
law specifies that detainees be tried for their offenses and detained only if convicted and then only for the period of the sentence.61 Clearly, humanitarian law envisions uniform-wearing
56. Bámaca-Velásquez v. Guatemala, Merits, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C)
No. 70 (Nov. 25, 2000), available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/
articulos/Seriec_70_ing.pdf; see also Las Palmeras v. Colombia, Preliminary
Objections, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 67 (Feb. 4, 2000), available at
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_67_ing.pdf (also following
the complementarity model); Dannenbaum Memo, supra note 30, at 9–10 (explaining the Inter-American Court’s decisions).
57. Bámaca-Velásquez, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. ¶ 209.
58. Coard v. United States, Inter-Am. C. H.R., Rep. No. 109/99, ¶ 39
(Sept. 29, 1999) (emphasis added), available at http://www1.umn.edu/
humanrts/cases/us109-99.html.
59. Id. ¶ 42.
60. For states willing to follow formal derogation procedures, these conflicts may, however, be avoided for most conflicts. See infra notes 157–59 and
accompanying text.
61. See infra Part IV.B.
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soldiers who enjoy POW status, while human rights law envisions civilians improperly swept up in an armed conflict who
enjoy the right to trial and then to release. But what if the person captured was a civilian taking part in hostilities? The Complementarity Model does not offer a tool for determining which
body of law applies when the two bodies of law are irreconcilable.
A second weakness of the Complementarity Model is that
the interpretive tools it does provide may undermine the very
norms the model seeks to protect. In cases of tension between
the two bodies of law, those applying a complementarity approach must engage in compromise to achieve harmony. This
compromise might require the dilution of both bodies of law to
force them into a relationship of interpretation. Or it might
consist of rhetorical acrobatics that pay lip service, rather than
do justice, to a rule on one side of a normative conflict. Even if
this leads to the “right” outcome as applied, it creates potentially damaging precedent by eviscerating a rule that might
properly apply in full force in another context.
The model described next—the Conflict Resolution Model—
allows the two bodies of law to be interpreted together. Unlike
the Complementarity Model, however, the Conflict Resolution
Model also accounts for the existence of true conflicts between
the two bodies of law and provides a tool for resolving them.
C. THE CONFLICT RESOLUTION MODEL
The Conflict Resolution Model provides that when an
armed conflict is present, human rights law and humanitarian
law are applied as they would be under the Complementarity
Model unless they are in conflict. If they conflict, however, the
model offers three possible decision rules for deciding the appropriate body of law to be applied.
As under the Complementarity Model, the existence of an
armed conflict does not immediately invalidate human rights
law within the zone of armed conflict. Instead, the existence of
an armed conflict simply prompts an inquiry into whether human rights law and humanitarian law inform, or conflict with,
one another. In this model, then, human rights law and humanitarian law obligations that govern the same conduct can
have either “relationships of interpretation” or “relationships of
conflict.”62 The International Law Commission explains these
terms as follows:
62. Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n, supra note 10, ¶ 2.
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 Relationships of interpretation. This is the case where
one norm assists in the interpretation of another. A norm
may assist in the interpretation of another norm for example as an application, clarification, updating, or modification of the latter. In such situation, both norms are
applied in conjunction.
 Relationships of conflict. This is the case where two legal
rules that are both valid and applicable point to incompatible decisions so that a choice must be made between
them.63
Under the Conflict Resolution Model, when legal rules (or
norms) drawn from the two bodies of law have a “relationship
of interpretation,” one legal rule assists in the interpretation of
another. In such cases, it is unnecessary to choose between the
two applicable legal rules.64 In cases where human rights law
and humanitarian law have a “relationship of conflict,” however, the “valid and applicable” legal rules drawn from each body
of law create incommensurate requirements.65 As a result, it is
necessary to look to conflict resolution rules to choose between
the two.66
Relationships of conflict may take two forms. The first is a
conflict between an obligation and a permission. Many humanitarian law rules that conflict with human rights law may be
characterized as permissive exceptions to baseline peacetime
norms carved out to accommodate military necessity. For example, humanitarian law grants States limited permission to
take the lives of combatants in the course of armed conflict.67
The second form of conflict is a conflict between two sets of obligations. This category includes situations in which a human
63. Id.
64. See Droege, supra note 38, at 523–24. This suggests yet a third reading of the ICJ’s Nuclear Weapons decision (or, perhaps more accurately, a different way of presenting the second reading): the lex specialis provides guidance about the application of the lex generalis to a specific circumstance, as
humanitarian law informed the application of Article 6 of the ICCPR to armed
conflict in Nuclear Weapons. See ICCPR, supra note 25, art. 6(1) (“Every human being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by law.
No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life.”).
65. Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n, supra note 10, ¶ 2.
66. See id.
67. It is also possible, although less common, for humanitarian law to impose an obligation where human rights law is permissive. For example, human
rights law would permit a state to impose sanctions for certain crimes for
which humanitarian law obligates States to grant immunity. See infra Part
IV.B.
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rights law obligation conflicts with a humanitarian law obligation such that it is impossible to comply with one without violating another. For example, humanitarian law obligates States
to observe and protect local customs. When these local customs
are contrary to human rights law obligations (for example, obligations to protect women from discrimination under the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination
Against Women), the state actor might face a conflict between
two sets of obligations.68
Figure 3 illustrates the decision-making process under the
Conflict Resolution Model. When the two bodies of law are in a
“relationship of interpretation,” they are applied in conjunction
with one another. The Conflict Resolution Model always treats
situations in which legal rules are in a relationship of interpretation as they would be treated under the Complementarity
Model. Hence, the Conflict Resolution Model is rooted in a narrower reading of the ICJ’s Nuclear Weapons advisory opinion,
in which the use of the word “arbitrary” in Article 6 of the
ICCPR creates enough space for humanitarian law to define
the boundaries of permissible killing without creating a normative conflict.69 This illustrates the analytical process that goes
into finding “relationships of interpretation” between the two
sets of legal rules.70

68. See infra Part IV.C.
69. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion,
1996 I.C.J. 226, ¶ 25 (July 8).
70. For more on this reading of the Nuclear Weapons advisory opinion, see
supra text accompanying notes 45–48.

2012]

LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT

1905

Figure 3
Conflict Resolution Model

Does the conduct occur within a zone of armed conflict?
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When legal rules are in a “relationship of conflict,” the Conflict Resolution model acknowledges that a decision maker
must select a rule to resolve the conflict. In this respect, it differs from the Complementarity Model, which does not
acknowledge that there can be such irreconcilable conflict. It
differs from the Displacement Model, as well, in that it only
provides for displacement of human rights law by humanitarian law in cases where the two bodies of law conflict, leaving
harmonious legal rules intact. As the International Law Commission has explained, “The maxim lex specialis derogat legi
generali is a generally accepted technique of interpretation and
conflict resolution in international law. It suggests that whenever two or more norms deal with the same subject matter, priority should be given to the norm that is more specific.”71
In practice, three different rules have been applied to resolve conflicts between the two bodies of law. We term these
three rules “event-specific displacement,” “reverse eventspecific displacement,” and “specificity.” When dealing with relationships of conflict, actors following the Conflict Resolution
Model will arrive at different conclusions depending on which
of the three decision rules for conflict resolution they select. We
discuss each rule briefly in turn.
1. Rule 1: Event-Specific Displacement
An event-specific displacement approach holds that humanitarian law displaces human rights law during times of
armed conflict, but only in the context of specific events in
which the relevant norms of each body of law conflict. Whereas
the Displacement Model outlined in Part II.A provides for displacement at the level of the armed conflict or military operation, the event-specific displacement version of the Conflict
Resolution Model applies displacement only to the specific
event in question. Hence human rights law may apply during
times of armed conflict to events or situations where humanitarian law does not conflict. Where there is a conflict, the
event-specific displacement rule of conflict resolution provides
that humanitarian law is always the lex specialis.
The ICJ’s Wall decision can be read to support this approach. Although the ICJ Wall decision accepts the applicability of human rights law during hostilities, it states that humanitarian law is the lex specialis: “In order to answer the question
71. Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n, supra note 10, ¶ 5.
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put to it, the Court will have to take into consideration both
these branches of international law, namely human rights law
and, as lex specialis, international humanitarian law.”72 It is
possible to read this to support the view that humanitarian law
prevails in instances where the two conflict. That said, this is
only one possible reading, as the ICJ does not, in its decision,
elect to apply humanitarian law over human rights law. Such a
choice was not necessary in the case, because the legal rules in
question—concerning annexation—were in a relationship of
interpretation.73
In contrast to the Israeli government, which, as noted earlier, has advocated the Displacement Model,74 the Israeli High
Court has adopted a position that appears to be consistent with
an event-specific displacement approach. In Public Committee
Against Torture in Israel v. Government of Israel, more commonly known as the Targeted Killings Case,75 the High Court
concludes that “humanitarian law is the lex specialis
which applies in the case of an armed conflict.”76 However,
“[w]hen there is a gap (lacuna) in that law, it can be supplemented by human rights law.”77 In other words, human rights
law does apply in armed conflict, but only when it is not in conflict with humanitarian law. In this case, the court uses human
rights law to inform humanitarian law. Additional Protocol I of
the Geneva Conventions provides that “civilians shall enjoy the
protections afforded by this section, unless and for such time as
they take a direct part in hostilities.”78 In interpreting the Protocol, the Court appeals to human rights standards articulated
by the European Court of Human Rights, concluding that “if a
terrorist taking a direct part in hostilities can be arrested, interrogated, and tried, those are the means which should be employed.”79 Yet in determining that civilians directly participat72. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, ¶ 106 (July 9).
73. See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 123–30.
74. See supra Part II.A.
75. HCJ 769/02 Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. Government of Israel 57(6) IsrSC 285 [2006] (Isr.), http://elyon1.court.gov.il/Files_
ENG/02/690/007/a34/02007690.a34.htm [hereinafter Targeted Killings Case];
see Dannenbaum Memo, supra note 30, at 42. Note that, like the Israeli executive branch, the High Court treats the situation in the Occupied Territories as
an IAC, rather than an occupation.
76. Targeted Killings Case, supra note 75, ¶ 18.
77. Id.
78. AP I, supra note 21, art. 51(3).
79. Targeted Killings Case, supra note 75, ¶ 40. The court uses similar
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ing in hostilities may be killed by the State without trial, the
court directly applies humanitarian law to the exclusion of human rights law. Thus, by considering human rights law where
it is not inconsistent with humanitarian law, but treating humanitarian law as the lex specialis, the Israeli High Court arguably employs an event-specific displacement rule of conflict
resolution.
The Government of Australia has also adopted the eventspecific displacement approach. “If Australia were exercising
authority as a consequence of an occupation or during a consensual deployment with the consent of a Host State, in circumstances in which the principles of international humanitarian law applied,” it explained, “Australia accepts that there is
some scope for the rights under the [ICCPR] to remain applicable, although in case of conflict between the applicable standards under the Covenant and the standards of international
humanitarian law, the latter applies as lex specialis.”80 Thus,
human rights law is not entirely displaced by humanitarian
law during times of armed conflict, but, again, humanitarian
law prevails in event-specific cases of conflict.
The event-specific decision rule is attractive in part because it adopts the simplicity of the Displacement Model, but in
a more fine-grained manner. It allows human rights law to remain applicable in all but those specific situations in which
there is direct conflict between the two bodies of law. When the
two bodies of law do conflict, it provides a clear and straightforward decision rule: displace human rights law with humanitarian law. Yet again the simplicity comes at a cost. Eventspecific displacement denies that human rights law may be better designed to regulate certain hostile situations. It is therefore not well suited to the increasingly common situations in
which armed conflict takes place outside the traditional battlefield. Moreover, by always displacing human rights law it
comes into conflict with humanitarian law, this approach could
deny jurisdiction to human rights treaty-based judicial bodies
in cases in which a State allegedly violated its human rights
obligations.
reasoning to conclude that the state must follow up any targeted killing with
an independent investigation, an human rights law duty for which the Court
again cites European Court of Human Rights cases and other human rights
authorities. Id.
80. Human Rights Comm., Replies to the List of Issues To Be Taken Up in
Connection With the Consideration of the Fifth Periodic Report of the Government of Australia, ¶ 19, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/AUS/Q/5/Add.1 (Feb. 5, 2009).
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2. Rule 2: Reverse Event-Specific Displacement
The reverse event-specific displacement rule is, as its name
suggests, the mirror image of the event-specific displacement
rule: While the event-specific displacement rule always resolves
conflicts between the two bodies of law in favor of human rights
law, the reverse event-specific displacement rule always resolves conflicts between the two bodies of law in favor of human
rights law. Unlike the other two rules described here, the reverse event-specific displacement rule has resulted entirely
from jurisdictional constraints on the courts themselves.
Two courts—the Inter-American Court for Human Rights
and the European Court of Human Rights—apply this rule because their primary jurisdictional mandate is to interpret human rights treaties.81 Thus, while they may look to humanitarian law norms for guidance in interpretation, their mandates
create a decision rule that favors human rights law.
To illustrate, consider the Inter-American Court for Human Rights’ Las Palmeras decision. There the court criticized
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights for directly
applying humanitarian law norms that are not present in, and
conflict with, the American Convention on Human Rights. The
Inter-American Court conceded that it may evaluate “any norm
of domestic or international law applied by a State, in times of
peace or armed conflict,” but it clarified that it was competent
only to determine if the norm “is compatible or not with the
American Convention,” which codifies applicable human rights
law.82 It continued:
In order to carry out this examination, the Court interprets the norm
in question and analyzes it in the light of the provisions of the Convention. The result of this operation will always be an opinion in
which the Court will say whether or not that norm or that fact is
compatible with the American Convention. The latter has only given
the Court competence to determine whether the acts or the norms of
the States are compatible with the Convention itself, and not with the
1949 Geneva Conventions.83

81. See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Sept. 3, 1953, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 (establishing the ECHR); Charter
of the Organization of American States, Apr. 30, 1948, 2 U.S.T. 2420, as
amended by The Protocol of Buenos Aires art. 106, Feb. 27, 1967, 21 U.S.T.
607 ( providing that the “principal function shall be to promote the observance
and protection of human rights”).
82. Las Palmeras v. Colombia, Preliminary Objections, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(ser. C) No. 67, ¶ 32 (Feb. 4, 2000).
83. Id. ¶ 33.
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Thus, when humanitarian law is incompatible with the
American Convention—where the legal rules from each body of
law share a relationship of conflict—the court is jurisdictionally
constrained to base its judgment on the American Convention
only.84
The European Court of Human Rights has similar restrictions. It, too, is strictly limited to adjudicating cases under
the European Convention on Human Rights, which codifies applicable human rights law.85 In McCann v. United Kingdom,
the European Court found that the United Kingdom had violated Article 2 of the European Convention in its antiterrorist operations against Irish Republican Army operatives in Gibraltar.86 Although the European Court acknowledged that the
soldiers reasonably perceived the use of lethal force to be necessary, it held in favor of McCann because the operation was not
designed to make killing a last resort, as required under human rights law.87 Hence, it applied human rights law to the exclusion of humanitarian law where the two were in conflict.
The reverse event-specific displacement rule has thus far
been applied only by courts that have exclusive jurisdiction
over human rights law. Like event-specific displacement, it has
the virtue of simplicity. But it is unlikely to be widely adopted
because it is plagued by the same problem as event-specific
displacement, but in mirror image: reverse event-specific displacement denies the reality that humanitarian rights law may
sometimes be better designed to regulate certain hostile situations. We thus turn to the third and final decision rule.
3. Rule 3: Specificity
The rule of specificity provides that in relationships of conflict between the two bodies of law, the law more specifically
tailored to the situation prevails.88 As with the other rules outlined here, the specificity rule applies at the level of an event or
84. See also Dannenbaum Memo, supra note 30, at 9.
85. For an extensive discussion of European Court of Human Rights
treatment of conduct in armed conflict, see id. at 19–21.
86. McCann v. United Kingdom, 324 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 64 (1995)
(holding by a ten to nine vote a violation of Article 2 of the Convention). For
other examples of European Court of Human Rights cases employing this approach, see Isayeva, Yusupova and Bazayeva v. Russia, 41 Eur. Ct. H.R. 39
(2005); Isayeva v. Russia, 41 Eur. Ct. H.R. 38 (2005).
87. McCann, 324 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 20–90; see also Dannenbaum
Memo, supra note 30, at 19.
88. See Droege, supra note 38, at 522–23.
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situation rather than at the level of the armed conflict. In contrast with the other two decision rules, however, the specificity
rule does not presuppose that either humanitarian law or human rights law is always the lex specialis. Rather, it looks to
which body of law is more specific to the situation at hand.89
This approach to resolving the conflict between humanitarian law and human rights law is the best available approach to
a complex problem. The specificity approach gives the widest
possible ambit for complementary application of the two bodies
of law—applying the two together when they are consistent or
“regulate different aspects of a situation or regulate a situation
in more or less detail”90—while addressing the inevitable conflicts by tailoring the legal rule to the context in which it operates. Whereas the other two conflict resolution rules ignore the
situational context by predetermining which law should apply
to it, the specificity rule allows for tailoring the choice of law to
best suit the particular situation. It therefore avoids many of
the weaknesses of other models, while offering a key benefit of
its own.
But it has a notable drawback. In contrast with the eventspecific displacement and reverse event-specific displacement
rules, the specificity approach lacks a consistent preemption
rule and the simplicity that comes with it. Instead of always
applying humanitarian law over human rights law in cases of
conflict between the two bodies of law or vice versa, it calls for a
judgment to be made regarding the most relevant law in each
instance. Indeed, a key feature of the specificity approach is its
dependence on facts—as circumstances change, so will the most
specific law.
The specificity rule’s greatest strength is therefore also its
greatest weakness: because the relevant law changes depending on the situation, the approach may seem impractical or
unworkable.91 The numerous considerations add nuance but also make the rule difficult to apply absent specific contextual
facts. Although very useful for ex post review of conduct during
89. Id. at 524.
90. Droege, supra note 31, at 343–44.
91. The Legal Advisor for the International Committee of the Red Cross,
Cordula Droege, notes, “[t]here may be controversy as to which norm is more
specialized in a concrete situation,” and indeed an abstract determination of
an entire area of law as being more specific towards another area of law is not,
in effect, realistic. Id. at 340; see Dannenbaum Memo, supra note 30, at 11.
Note that this position differs from the official position of the ICRC, which favors the complementarity approach. See Kellenberger, supra note 42.
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armed conflict, the rule complicates ex ante decision making,
particularly on the ground.
Yet the weakness is not as severe as it may at first seem.
Truly unavoidable relationships of conflict between the two
bodies of law are discrete, predictable, and rare.92 Most human
rights norms are derogable in times of emergency.93 Moreover,
because relationships of conflict may be accounted for ex ante,
some legal rules are clearly identifiable as the lex specialis by
their design. For example, humanitarian law regulating treatment of POWs is specifically and clearly designed to apply to
any instance in which a State captures members of the armed
forces of a state with which it is engaged in armed conflict.94
Only in a few, limited cases will it be difficult to predict which
body of law will provide the lex specialis. In these cases, it is
not clear that other models for resolving conflict between the
two bodies of law serve decision makers any better. For example, the Displacement Model is straightforward once one identifies the zone of armed conflict, but that preliminary inquiry is
highly complicated and becomes extremely high-stakes.
Using the Conflict Resolution Model as a guide, government policy makers can identify foreseeable relationships of
conflict and develop rules to address them.95 These individuals
are well-positioned to apply the specificity rule with all its
complexities and convert their conclusions into manuals, like
the Uniform Code of Military Justice. That way, on-the-ground
decision makers can apply rules that have already been run
through the Conflict Resolution Model. This underscores the
importance of carefully examining these two bodies of law before making critical policy decisions. This kind of approach can
achieve predictability, protection of human dignity, and decisiveness on the battlefield.
We turn in the next Part to explaining the specificity rule
of the conflict resolution model in greater detail, showing how it
has been used by international bodies and states in practice,
and outlining five key factors that should guide those using the
rule to determine the applicable body of law.
92. See Gabrielle Marceau, WTO Dispute Settlement and Human Rights,
13 EUR. J. INT’L L. 753, 756 (2002).
93. See infra Part IV.
94. See generally Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1950)
(outlining the treatment of POWs in armed conflicts).
95. See infra Part IV.
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III. THE SPECIFICITY RULE OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION
The specificity rule of conflict resolution applies humanitarian and human rights law in conjunction—using them to inform one another—whenever possible. When the two bodies of
law are in direct conflict, however, it provides a decision rule
for choosing between the two that turns on which legal rule is
most specific to the situation.
To illustrate this approach, we begin here by showing how
the specificity model has been used in real-world situations to
resolve conflicts between the two bodies of law, demonstrating
that courts can and have successfully apply the test. Second, to
further clarify the test and show how it may be applied to a
wide variety of situations in which there is a conflict between
human rights law and humanitarian law, we outline and describe five factors to guide the choice between the two bodies of
law. This sets the stage for the next Part, in which we describe
four specific conflicts between humanitarian law and human
rights law and show how they can be best resolved using this
specificity rule.
A. THE SPECIFICITY RULE IN PRACTICE
The specificity approach has been adopted and used by
States to resolve specific conflicts. A number of countries, including Canada and Germany, have indicated that they subscribe to versions of this approach. For instance, in a brief in
Amnesty International Canada v. Chief of the Defence Staff for
the Canadian Forces, the Canadian Government stated:
A state’s international human rights obligations, to the extent that
they have extraterritorial effect, are not displaced [in armed conflict].
However, the relevant human rights principles can only be decided by
reference to the law applicable in armed conflict, the lex specialis of
IHL: Critically, in the event of an apparent inconsistency in the content of the two strands of law, the more specific provisions will prevail: in relation to targeting in the conduct of hostilities, for example,
human rights law will refer to more specific provisions (the lex
specialis) of humanitarian law.96

Canada thus argued that humanitarian law is more specific to
the conduct under review—“targeting in the conduct of hostilities”—and therefore it is the lex specialis. The government is
96. Respondents’ Factum Re: Determination of Two Questions, Pursuant
to Rule 107 of the Federal Courts Rules, Regarding the Application of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms at 26, Amnesty Int’l Canada v. Canada [2009] 4 F.C.R. 149 (No. T-324 -07) (Can.) (internal citations and quotations
omitted).
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careful to note that only “specific provisions . . . of humanitarian law” become the lex specialis, not the entire body of law.
The German Government has taken a similar stance, tailoring its instructions to the relevant body of law as follows:
Wherever its police or armed forces are deployed abroad, in particular
when participating in peace missions, Germany ensures to all persons
that they will be granted the rights recognized in the [ICCPR], insofar
as they are subject to its jurisdiction . . . . The training it gives its security forces for international missions includes tailor-made instruction in the provisions of the Covenant.97

Many State parties to the Convention on the Rights of the
Child98 have also adopted the specificity approach in drafting
the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the
Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict.99 The
Protocol prohibits state parties and non-state armed parties
from recruiting children for military service in armed conflicts.100 In the preamble, state parties recall their obligations
to protect children from violence under human rights and humanitarian law, but they emphasize their duties under the latter.101 The Protocol specifies that state parties should use the
specificity approach when human rights and humanitarian obligations conflict, applying the body of law most able to protect
children from violence: “Nothing in the present Protocol shall
be construed as precluding provisions in the law of a State Party or in international instruments and international humanitarian law that are more conducive to the realization of the
rights of the child.”102
Three separate Inter-American Commission decisions illustrate the three different outcomes that can result from using

97. U.N. Human Rights Comm., Comments by the Government of Germany to the Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Comm., U.N. Doc.
CCPR/CO/80/DEU/Add.1, at 3 (Apr. 11, 2005).
98. Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3.
99. Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the
Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, G.A. Res. 54/263, 54th Sess, U.N.
Doc. A/RES/54/263 (May 25, 2000).
100. Id. arts. 1–4.
101. The Preamble to the Optional Protocol notes the various prohibitions
on violence against children in armed conflict in the Rome Statute, ICRC
commentary, and International Labour Organization Convention No. 182. It
further recalls generally “the obligation of each party to an armed conflict to
abide by the provisions of international humanitarian law.” Id. pmbl.
102. Id. art. 5.
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the specificity version of the Conflict Resolution Model.103 First,
in Avilán v. Colombia, the Inter-American Commission found a
relationship of interpretation among human rights law and
humanitarian law governing the extrajudicial execution of individuals hors de combat.104 In that opinion, the Commission
reasoned that “[i]t is precisely in situations of internal armed
conflict that human rights and humanitarian law converge
most precisely and reinforce one another.”105 This decision illustrates the way in which the specificity model—like the other
conflict resolution models—applies both bodies of law in a relationship of interpretation whenever possible.
Second, in Abella v. Argentina, the Inter-American Commission resolved a conflict between the two bodies of law in favor of humanitarian law. The case required the Commission to
determine whether the killing of attackers in the La Tablada
battle in Argentina violated Article 4 of the American Convention.106 After noting that Article 4 creates a non-derogable right
to life, the Commission determined that it provides little guidance in situations of armed conflict, as it does not distinguish
between civilians and combatants. Instead, the Inter-American
Commission turned to Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions to conclude that there had been no rights violation.107
Upon identifying the casualties as combatants, the InterAmerican Commission did not consider any human rights lawbased “requirements to warn, attempt to arrest, or shoot to injure rather than kill.”108 There was a relationship of conflict between these potential human rights law obligations, rooted in
the American Convention, and the implicit humanitarian law
permission to abandon these precautions in battle. The InterAmerican Commission resolved the conflict in favor of humanitarian law because humanitarian law was more specifically tailored to the situation.
103. This is the same tripartite structure that Tom Dannenbaum ultimately recommends in his memo to the Lowenstein Clinic. See Dannenbaum
Memo, supra note 30, at 69.
104. Avilán v. Colombia, Case 11.142, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No.
26/97, OEA/Ser.L./V/II.95, doc. 7 rev. ¶ 140 (1997).
105. Id. ¶ 174. Note that the same is arguably true of occupation. See infra
text accompanying note 108. For a further explanation of the case, see
Dannenbaum Memo, supra note 30, at 31–33.
106. Abella v. Argentina, Case 11.137, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No.
55/97, OEA/Ser.L./V/II.95, doc. 7 rev. ¶ 5 (1997).
107. Id. ¶¶ 156, 161, 188; see also Dannenbaum Memo, supra note 30, at
30–31.
108. Dannenbaum Memo, supra note 30, at 31.

1916

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[96:1883

Third, in its Third Report on the Human Rights Situation
in Colombia,109 the Inter-American Commission resolved a conflict between the two bodies of law in favor of human rights law,
despite the fact that it acknowledged the existence of an armed
conflict in the country.110 The Inter-American Commission applied humanitarian law to certain conduct within Colombia.
But when faced with the extrajudicial killings of “marginal
groups” engaged in criminal activities, it applied a “pure” human
rights law enforcement standard.111 Even though humanitarian
law exists for situations of non-international armed conflict, the
Commission found human rights law to be more specifically tailored to the State’s treatment of criminal activity.112
Thus, the jurisprudence of the Inter-American Commission
demonstrates the full range of outcomes possible under the
specificity approach. By applying a specificity rule of conflict
resolution, the Inter-American Commission has determined
that the governing body of law depends on the relationship between the applicable legal rules and the particular circumstances to which the legal rules are to be applied. Put differently, the Commission has found itself, at different times, at each
possible outcome of the Conflict Resolution Model.
Together, these examples demonstrate that although the
specificity rule is more complex than either the event-specific or
reverse event-specific displacement rules, governments, courts,
and international organizations have nonetheless successfully
used the approach. In doing so, they have applied legal rules
that are most appropriate and most closely tailored to the circumstances of the case, giving maximum effect to each body of
law in situations in which they are most specific and relevant.
Yet more still can be done to clarify this approach and
thereby make it more functional and accessible to a wider variety of decision makers. In the next Section, we begin this project by outlining five factors that should be used in applying the
specificity rule. These five factors offer detailed guidance to de-

109. Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Third Report on the Human Rights Situation
in Colombia, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.102, doc. 9 rev. 1 (1999) [hereinafter Colombia
Report].
110. See id. ch. 1, at ¶ 20 (discussing how drug trafficking groups “began to
finance and support the paramilitary groups”).
111. See id. ch. 4, at ¶ 213 (applying Article 4 of the American Convention
to police responses to the “marginal groups”).
112. See Dannenbaum Memo, supra note 30, at 33–34, for a more detailed
account of the case.
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cision makers seeking to determine which body of law is more
specific to any particular event.
B. FIVE FACTORS FOR DETERMINING SPECIFICITY
Drawing on a variety of sources—including prior case law,
scholarship, and governing treaties—we propose five factors to
guide States and courts in using the specificity rule to choose
between humanitarian law and human rights law in the event
of an irreconcilable conflict between them. To determine which
body of law is more specific, States and courts should consider:
(1) the wording and content of the norms themselves; (2) the
nature of the norms in question, (3) whether a State exercises
effective control, (4) expressions of intent by parties to relevant
treaties, and (5) state practice. We discuss each in turn.
1. Wording and Content of Norms
As a starting point, it is important to look to the text of the
rule of law that is being applied. When a norm uses terms that
make it uniquely relevant to the conduct at hand, that rule
may become the lex specialis.113 For this reason, much existing
practice favors treating humanitarian law as the lex specialis
during instances of armed conflict.114 For example, in determining the proper treatment of combatants involved in an armed
conflict, humanitarian law frequently is treated as the lex
specialis because, among other things, it distinguishes between
combatants and civilians.115 There is still room, however, for
human rights law to prevail in special circumstances, especially
during occupation and non-international armed conflict; it is in
these circumstances that the specificity approach is most likely
to depart from the event-specific displacement approach outlined above.116
113. See Droege, supra note 38, at 522 (“[The concept of lex specialis] stems
from a Roman principle of interpretation according to which, in situations especially regulated by a specific rule, this rule would displace the more general
rule.”).
114. See Droege, supra note 31, at 318 (“As is well-known, most human
rights can be derogated from in time of public emergency, which includes situations of armed conflict.”).
115. See, e.g., Abella v. Argentina, Case 11.137, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R.,
Report No. 55/97, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.95, doc. 7 rev. ¶¶ 152–53 (1997) (discussing
the application of humanitarian law to the conflict).
116. See Droege, supra note 38, at 524 –29 (noting the complex interplay of
human rights law and humanitarian law in the areas of occupation and
noninternational armed conflict).
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2. The Nature of the Norms in Question
In addition to the wording and content, it is important to
consider the nature of the norms in question. For example, does
the relationship of conflict exist between a human rights law
obligation and a humanitarian law permission or does it exist
between two obligations?117 As noted above, in many cases humanitarian law creates permissions—exceptions carved out to
accommodate military necessity (for example, permission to kill
enemy combatants in the context of armed conflict).118 Humanitarian law also generates obligations, some of which may create
protections that even go beyond those provided by human
rights law (for example, the obligation not to try POWs and to
release them at the end of the armed conflict).119 Where humanitarian law creates an obligation on a State, it is more likely to be the lex specialis.120 In contrast, whether a humanitarian law permission is the lex specialis depends largely on the
other four factors.
3. Effective Control
There is an emerging international consensus that states
have an obligation to obverse human rights obligations wherever they exercise effective control. Effective control is also an
important factor for determining whether humanitarian law or
human rights law is more specific to a particular situation.
Where a State exercises greater effective control on the ground,
that counsels in favor of applying human rights law as the
more specifically tailored and relevant body of law.121 For instance, in occupation,122 a state actor may exercise significant
territorial control, and therefore human rights law may be the
more specific body of law applicable to that State’s actions.123
117. See supra text accompanying notes 60–62.
118. See ICRC, supra note 21, at 3–8 (discussing how combatants are
viewed under humanitarian law).
119. See GC III, supra note 13, art. 4 (relating to the treatment of POWs
during armed conflict).
120. Cf. Droege, supra note 38, at 524 (stating that if a rule creates an exception to a general rule it is more likely to be the lex specialis, which would
be the case if a rule created a permission).
121. Cf. id. at 525–29 (discussing how humanitarian law rests in part on
the premise that a government needs to be able to weaken the military forces
of its enemies).
122. See id. at 537–39 (describing occupation and how humanitarian versus human rights law could apply).
123. See, e.g., Human Rts. Comm., General Comment No. 31 on Article 2 of
the Covenant: The Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States
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Conversely, when States exercise less control, humanitarian
law is more likely to be the appropriate body of law in cases of
conflict between the two.124 Paradigmatically, the scope of
States’ human rights obligations is limited during battlefield
hostilities because the States lack effective control.125 During
active armed conflict, the exigencies of war expand the scope of
permissible action, while chaos, fear, and timing limit the capacity of States to meet obligations reasonably expected of
them in other contexts, counseling in favor of applying humanitarian law as the lex specialis.126
U.N. bodies have endorsed the view that state actors have
greater responsibility to honor human rights obligations when
and where they exercise greater effective control, particularly
during occupation.127 The U.N. General Assembly cautioned the
Soviet Union about its human rights obligations during its occupation of Hungary as early as 1956.128 In 1967, during the
Six Days War, the U.N. General Assembly reminded Israel that
“essential and inalienable human rights should be respected
even during the vicissitudes of war.”129 The unique nature of
occupation may also explain why the ICJ changed the tenor of
its jurisprudence on this question in DRC v. Uganda.130 In that
case, it did not identify humanitarian law as the lex specialis—
as it had in its Nuclear Weapons and Wall opinions—but instead emphasized its earlier statements on the applicability of
human rights law to extraterritorial State activity during
occupation.131

Parties to the Covenant, ¶ 10, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/74/CRP.4/Rev.6 (May 26,
2004) (using a government’s “effective control” of a territory in determining
which body of international law applies).
124. Id.
125. See Droege, supra note 31, at 330 (“[ W ]ith varying degrees of control,
the state has varying obligations, going from the duty to respect to the duties
to protect and fulfil [sic] human rights.”).
126. See id. at 347 (arguing that humanitarian law should apply in situations where “government forces [have] no real control” over the situation); see
also Dannenbaum Memo, supra note 30, at 11 (citing Droege, supra note 31)).
127. See Droege, supra note 38, at 537–39 (describing occupation’s implications for determining the applicable rule of law).
128. Id. at 504 –05; see also G.A. Res. 1312 (XIII), 13th Sess., U.N. Doc.
A/38/49 (Dec. 12, 1958).
129. S.C. Res. 237, pmbl. ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. A/237/1967 (June 14, 1967).
130. See Droege, supra note 31, at 522 (discussing the ICJ’s seemingly inexplicable change of course in this case).
131. Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v.
Uganda), Judgment, 2005 I.C.J. 168, ¶ 216 (Dec. 19, 2005).
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As the ICJ’s opinion in DRC v. Uganda reveals, effective
control has gained traction as the guiding principle for extraterritorial application of human rights.132 It is important to
note, however, that effective control factors into the equation
differently when it is used to determine whether human rights
law preempts humanitarian law than when it is used to determine whether human rights law applies at all.133 The two applications dovetail in DRC v. Uganda because their underlying
premise is the same: territorial control increases the responsibility of the State to fulfill its human rights obligations.134
Thus, according to some, human rights law sometimes
preempts humanitarian law in zones of effective control.135 But
the difference in the question—does human rights law apply, as
opposed to does human rights law preempt—can lead to very
different outcomes.
First, in addition to being arguably dispositive outside the
sovereign territory of a State in determining the applicability of
human rights law, effective control is also a relevant consideration within the sovereign territory when used as a component
of the specificity approach.136 While human rights law presumptively applies within the sovereign territory—thus requiring no effective control test—it does not necessarily preempt
humanitarian law in situations of a noninternational armed
conflict that occurs entirely within the sovereign territory of a
single State.137 A court applying the specificity rule of conflict
132. See Hathaway et al., supra note 27, at 390 (discussing how most international jurisdictions have adopted the “effective control” test).
133. See, e.g., id. at 393–94 (discussing the competing arguments as to
whether the Covenant or Convention Against Torture apply to U.S. actions
abroad).
134. See Uganda, 2005 I.C.J. ¶ 189 (“The DRC charges that Uganda
breached its obligation of vigilance incumbent upon it as an occupying Power
by failing to enforce respect for human rights and international humanitarian
law in the occupied regions, and particularly in Ituri.”).
135. See, e.g., id. ¶ 248 (“The Court further observes that the fact that
Uganda was the occupying Power in Ituri district . . . extends Uganda’s obligation to take appropriate measures to prevent the looting, plundering and exploitation of natural resources in the occupied territory to cover private persons in this district and not only members of Ugandan military forces.”).
136. See, e.g., Droege, supra note 38, at 527 (“[ I ]t is relatively uncontroversial that the rules regulating the conduct of hostilities . . . are part of a customary international humanitarian law applicable to non-international armed
conflicts.”).
137. See id. at 530–33 (surveying the case law of the European Court of
Human Rights on the issue of whether human rights law preempts humanitarian law in these situations).

2012]

LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT

1921

resolution might consider the degree to which the government
of that State exercises effective control over the hostile situation to determine whether human rights law or humanitarian
law prevails in that situation.138
Second, in determining the lex specialis, the presence of effective control is not decisive by itself.139 For example, prisoners
of war may be within the effective control of a State, but the
wording and content of the norms, as well as extensive state
practice, indicates that they should not be charged with murder
for lawful battlefield killings—actions for which they are legally immune under humanitarian law.140 In such cases, effective
control should not lead States to enforce human rights trial
norms, for doing so would effectively strip prisoners of war of
their immunity.141 In this case, humanitarian law is clearly the
lex specialis despite the State’s effective control.142 As noted
above, effective control may be more relevant to situations
where humanitarian law grants states permission and less relevant where humanitarian law imposes obligations on states,
in part because the special obligations may be born of conditions other than military necessity.143
This distinction has two important implications. First, it
means that actors applying the specificity model must often
consider additional factors beyond effective control to resolve
the normative conflict between the two bodies of law. Second, it
means that an actor need not accept that the extraterritorial
application of human rights law turns on effective control in
order to accept the relevance of effective control for resolving
conflicts between the two bodies of law. A decision-maker may
use an entirely different rule to determine whether human
rights law applies but still look to effective control to determine
whether applicable human rights law prevails.
138. See, e.g., Abella v. Argentina, Case 11.137, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R.,
Report No. 55/97, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.95, doc. 7 rev. ¶193 (1997) (suggesting that
human rights law should apply after the arrest of attackers, due in part to the
state’s level of control); see also supra notes 106–08 and accompanying text
(discussing the Abella case).
139. See Droege, supra note 31, at 332 (discussing how the threshold determinations for “effective control” differ between the application of humanitarian law versus human rights law).
140. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
141. Id.
142. See GC III, supra note 13, art. 4 (delineating the law to be applied to
POWs with specificity so as to render it the lex specialis).
143. See discussion supra Part III.B.2.
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4. Expressions of Intent
The fourth consideration—expressions of intent—derives
from Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which provides that treaties should be interpreted in light
of their purpose, as expressed variously through agreements of
the parties and instruments drawn up by individual parties in
preparation for ratification.144
In the Inter-American Commission’s decision in Avilán v.
Colombia, for example, the Commission cited a previous expression of intent by the Government of Colombia to support a
decision not to apply a law of war framework to extra-judicial
killing, but rather to apply human rights law norms.145 The
Commission explained:
[T]here are additional elements that lead the Commission to consider
that the victims were defenseless when assassinated by members of
the police. For example, the judgment of the Administrative Tribunal
of Cundinamarca, of June 3, 1993, held that the State was responsible
for the death of four of the individuals and ordered that compensation
be paid, rejecting the argument of legitimate action in combat . . . .146

Hence, the Colombian State had previously indicated its intent
to consider the relevant conduct outside the law of war framework, and the Inter-American Commission used this expression
of intent to come to its own decision.147
5. State Practice
State practice under the various instruments of humanitarian law and human rights law helps to reveal their proper
scope and relationship to one another. As Article 31(3)(b) of the
Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties explains: treaty interpretation should be guided by “[a]ny subsequent practice in
the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of
the parties regarding its interpretation.”148 Hence, state prac-

144. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 31, May 23, 1969,
1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
145. Avila v. Colombia, Case 11.142, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No.
26/97, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.95, doc. 7 rev. ¶ 165 (1997) (“The State argued that it
did not dispute that members of the police killed the victims named in this
case. Nonetheless, the State considered that these deaths did not involve violations of the victims’ rights because they occurred as the result of the legitimate use of force by State agents.”).
146. Id. ¶ 136.
147. Id.
148. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 144, art.
31(3)(b).
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tice informs treaty interpretation and helps to shape a customary law of lex specialis.149
For example, human rights law requires States (with narrow exceptions not relevant here) to bring any person deprived
of their liberty to trial for a valid criminal offense within a reasonable period,150 while humanitarian law permits States to intern enemy combatants as prisoners of war for the duration of
hostilities and prohibits States from subjecting them to trial
except for war crimes or for crimes committed during their internment.151 In resolving this conflict under the specificity rule,
the “effective control” factor would suggest that, since prisoners
of war are under the detaining State’s control, human rights
law should govern.152 However, there is a wealth of state practice indicating that humanitarian law, not human rights law,
properly governs the detention of enemy combatants without
trial during international armed conflicts.153 Indeed, the provisions of the Third Geneva Convention on the detention of prisoners of war during international armed conflict are generally
recognized as customary international law.154 Thus state practice—together with the nature of the norms in conflict (a humanitarian law obligation and a human rights law obligation)—suggest that humanitarian law is the lex specialis, even
though the State exercises “effective control” over the enemy
combatant.
Having laid out the specificity test, we turn next to examining the stakes of this decision rule by looking at when the two
bodies of law are truly in conflict—and therefore where the
mechanism for choosing between the two comes into play.

149. See Droege, supra note 31, at 542–46 (more on the expressive influence of court jurisprudence).
150. See discussion infra Part IV.B (right to trial); see also ICCPR, supra
note 25, art. 9 (“Anyone arrested or detained on a criminal charge shall be
brought promptly before a judge . . . .”).
151. See GC III, supra note 13, art. 4 (regarding the treatment of POWs
during armed conflicts).
152. See discussion supra Part III.B.3.
153. See, e.g., Hathaway, et al., supra note 27, at 400–04 (discussing examples of how the European Court of Human Rights has applied its analysis to
this type of conflict of laws).
154. See ICRC, supra note 21, at 344 –45 (discussing the Third Geneva
Convention and its application in international law).

1924

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[96:1883

IV. THE STAKES: WHEN THE TWO BODIES OF LAW
CONFLICT
Here we explore the stakes of the choice between human
rights law and humanitarian law by examining several areas in
which human rights law and humanitarian law have conflicting legal rules. While the areas of law examined here—the
right to life, detention and the right to trial, women’s rights,
and the rights of free expression, association, and movement—
include the most significant areas of conflict between the two
bodies of law, this discussion is intended to be illustrative rather than exhaustive. For each area of law, we lay out the relevant human rights law, the relevant humanitarian law, and
the ways in which each of the models outlined in Part II of this
Article would resolve conflict between them. For purposes of
this discussion, we focus on the human rights obligations imposed by customary international law, the ICCPR, and
CEDAW.155
155. We recognize that the U.S. representatives have taken the position
that the ICCPR does not apply extraterritorially. See Letter of Kevin Moley,
supra note 26 (stating that it is not the position of the United States that the
ICCPR applies extraterritorially); see also Michael J. Dennis, Application of
Human Rights Treaties Extraterritorially in Times of Armed Conflict and Military Occupation, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 119, 125 (2005) (“States have also expressed disagreement with the Committee’s view that the Covenant applies to
acts of a state’s armed forces performed outside that state’s territory.”). That
view, however, is not accepted by the Human Rights Committee and is generally regarded as an outlier position. See, e.g., Human Rights Comm., Comments of the Human Rights Committee on the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, ¶ 284, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.50 (Oct. 3, 1995) (“The
Committee does not share the view expressed by the Government that the
Covenant lacks extraterritorial reach under all circumstances.”). Moreover,
the ICCPR includes several norms that create potential conflicts with humanitarian law norms. See, e.g., Letter of Kevin Moley, supra note 26 (arguing that
the ICCPR leads to an absurd result in that “during an ongoing armed conflict,
unlawful combatants receive more procedural rights than would lawful combatants under the Geneva Conventions”). In addition, we address CEDAW despite the fact that the United States has not ratified the Convention. See Div.
for the Advancement of Women, Dep’t of Econ. & Soc. Affairs, Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women: State Parties,
U.N. http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/states.htm ( last visited Feb.
28, 2012) (showing the countries who have ratified CEDAW). We do so because, (1) Afghanistan has ratified CEDAW, and it therefore arguably applies
to U.S. activities in Afghanistan conducted with the Afghan government’s consent; (2) some of the norms embodied in CEDAW are considered by some to be
binding as customary international law; and (3) CEDAW remains before the
Senate. See id; see also LUISA BLANCHFIELD, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R 40750,
THE U.N. CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN (CEDAW): ISSUES IN THE U.S. RATIFICATION DEBATE 4
(2011) (discussing how CEDAW remains before the U.S. Senate); Bharathi
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As a preliminary matter, it is important to note that, with
the exception of the obligations to protect the right to life under
the ICCPR and women’s rights under CEDAW, all of the human rights obligations discussed in this Part are derogable.156
Derogation allows States to temporarily abrogate an obligation
under exceptional emergency circumstances.157 Thus, where
permitted and accepted by courts, derogation can resolve conflicts between the two bodies of law.158 In order to derogate,
however, a State must notify other parties to the relevant human rights instrument and must explain which provisions it is
derogating and its reasons for doing so.159 This public procedure significantly raises the political costs of derogation.160 Indeed, it implicitly acknowledges that the actions taken might
violate human rights law in the absence of the derogation.161
For this reason, States rarely formally derogate from their human rights obligations.162 The remainder of this Part will assume that the State to which the law applies has not formally
derogated from its relevant human rights obligations. However,
unless the discussion notes that an obligation is nonderogable,
Anandhi Venkatraman, Islamic States and the United Nations Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women: Are the Shari’a and the Convention Compatible?, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 1949, 1953 (1995)
(“[T]he Women’s Convention serves as an international treaty for those countries that have ratified it.”).
156. See discussion infra Part IV.B (right to trial), and Part IV.D (rights to
freedom of expression, association, and movement).
157. See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 25, art. 4 (“In time of public emergency
which threatens the life of the nation and the existence of which is officially
proclaimed, the States Parties to the present Covenant may take measures
derogating from their obligations under the present Covenant to the extent
strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that such
measures are not inconsistent with their other obligations under international
law and do not involve discrimination solely on the ground of race, colour, sex,
language, religion or social origin.”).
158. Id.
159. See, e.g., id. (“Any State Party to the present Covenant availing itself
of the right of derogation shall immediately inform the other States Parties to
the present Covenant, through the intermediary of the Secretary-General of
the United Nations, of the provisions from which it has derogated and of the
reasons by which it was actuated. A further communication shall be made,
through the same intermediary, on the date on which it terminates such
derogation.”).
160. Cf. Dennis, supra note 155, at 135–36 (discussing state practice in
derogating from ICCPR obligations).
161. Id.
162. See id. (“[N]ot one state has submitted a notice of derogation suspending the extraterritorial application of the Covenant during periods of armed
conflict or military occupation.”).
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derogation remains an option for resolving the conflicts discussed here.
A. THE RIGHT TO LIFE
One of the clearest areas of conflict between the two bodies
of law involves the right to life. Humanitarian law permits
state agents to intentionally kill combatants and incidentally
kill civilians (within clearly proscribed limits) in circumstances
that human rights law does not countenance.163 Some of the
conflicts between these legal frameworks can be resolved by
reading ambiguous terms in human rights instruments to incorporate standards from humanitarian law during armed conflict,164 but at bottom the two bodies of law give fundamentally
different answers to the question of when state agents can use
lethal force.
The ICCPR provides: “Every human being has the inherent
right to life. This right shall be protected by law. No one shall
be arbitrarily deprived of his life.”165 The obligation is nonderogable.166 The use of the word “arbitrarily” in this provision
clearly implies that lethal force is permitted under some circumstances, but the text of the ICCPR itself provides little
guidance on what those circumstances are.167 An Expert Meeting on the Right to Life in Armed Conflicts and Situations of
Occupation168 described the basic human rights law framework
163. See discussion supra Part III.B.2.
164. See discussion supra Part II.C.3 (discussing the specificity model of
conflict of laws).
165. ICCPR, supra note 25, art. 6.
166. Id. art. 4 (stating that the provisions of Article 6 are nonderogable).
167. See generally id. ( lacking clear guidance as to what situations allow
the use of lethal force in international conflicts).
168. The Expert Meeting was organized by the University Centre for International Humanitarian Law, Geneva, and included a dozen prominent legal
practitioners and academics. The participants were:
 William Abresch, Director, Extra-Judicial Executions Program, Center
for Human Rights and Global Justice, New York University School of
Law;
 Yuri Boychenko, Head of Division for Human Rights and Humanitarian
Affairs, Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation, Geneva;
 Knut Dörmann, Deputy Head of the Legal Division, ICRC, Geneva;
 Professor Louise Doswald-Beck, Director, University Centre for International Humanitarian Law, Graduate Institute of International Studies,
Geneva;
 Frederico Andreu Guzman, Senior Legal Advisor, International Commission of Jurists, Geneva;
 Professor Françoise J. Hampson, University of Essex, Member of the
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for the use of lethal force as “the law enforcement model,”
which has “two main features”:
First, the use of potentially lethal force is restricted to a narrow range
of circumstances. Likewise, the use of potentially lethal force must be
proportionate; it must be limited to addressing the threat which is
posed. The other main feature of the law enforcement model is that,
where possible, State officials must arrest rather than kill persons
who are posing a threat. Likewise, States must plan their operations
so as to maximize the chances of being able to effect an arrest. 169

In other words, under human rights law, the use of lethal force is
only permitted in situations in which it is necessary to address a
specific threat that cannot be neutralized through arrest.
Humanitarian law, on the other hand, allows far wider use
of lethal force. As codified in the Geneva Conventions and in
customary international law, humanitarian law permits state
agents to target and kill enemy combatants who have not laid
down their arms or been placed hors de combat. Humanitarian
law also permits States to target civilians who are directly participating in hostilities for the duration of their participation in
hostilities.170 Enemy combatants do not have to pose a specific
threat at the time they are targeted, nor do state agents have
to attempt to arrest them before killing them. Moreover, humanitarian law permits state agents to kill noncombatant civilians in the course of attacking enemy combatants as long as the
attack is aimed at a concrete and direct military objective and
the resulting harm to civilians is necessary and proportionate
to that objective.171 In other words, humanitarian law allows
the use of lethal force subject to the principles of: (1) distinction
U.N. Sub-Commission on Human Rights, Governor of the British Institute of Human Rights;
 Professor Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg, Europa Universität Viandrina,
Frankfurt (Oder);
 Professor David Kretzmer, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem;
 Colonel Philip McEvoy, Legal Advisor, Army Legal Services, United
Kingdom;
 Jelena Pejic, Legal Advisor, ICRC Legal Division, Geneva;
 Steven Solomon, Principal Legal Officer, World Health Organization,
Geneva, former Deputy Legal Advisor, U.S. Mission, Geneva; and
 Wilder Tayler, Legal Director, Human Rights Watch.
EXPERT MEETING ON THE RIGHT TO LIFE IN ARMED CONFLICT AND SITUATIONS
OF OCCUPATION, UNIVERSITY CENTRE FOR INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN
LAW, GENEVA, SWITZ. 43 (2005), available at http://www.adh-geneva.ch/docs/
expert-meetings/2005/3rapport_droit_vie.pdf.
169. Id. at 8.
170. See AP I, supra note 21, art. 51(3).
171. See id. arts. 51(5)(b), 57.
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(the parties to the conflict must distinguish between civilians
and civilian objects and military objectives); (2) military necessity (attacks must aim to achieve a concrete and direct military
advantage); and (3) proportionality (incidental loss of civilian
life, injury to civilians, and damage to civilian objects must be
proportional to the concrete and direct military advantage
anticipated).172
The core tensions between the two bodies of law around the
right to life thus concern the type of threat a person must pose
before he or she can be targeted, whether the State has a duty
to attempt to arrest a person before resorting to lethal force,
and the degree to which the attack can incidentally harm noncombatant civilians. The three models described in Part II of
this Article—displacement, complementarity, and conflict resolution—provide different approaches to resolving these tensions.
The Displacement Model asks simply whether the relevant
conduct is part of an armed conflict or not. If it is armed conflict, then humanitarian law applies, and if not, then the human rights “law enforcement model” applies. The ICJ’s Nuclear
Weapons Advisory Opinion can be read to follow this approach,
as it explains that “whether a particular loss of life, through
the use of a certain weapon in warfare, is to be considered an
arbitrary deprivation of life . . . can only be decided by reference
to the law applicable in armed conflict and not deduced from
the terms of the [ICCPR] itself.”173
The Complementarity Model, on the other hand, would deny that there is any irresolvable conflict between the two bodies
of law. The ICJ’s Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion can alternatively be read to follow this approach, as it asserts that the
ICCPR applies during armed conflict, but that during armed
conflict “[t]he test of what is an arbitrary deprivation of life
[under the ICCPR] . . . falls to be determined by the applicable
lex specialis,” namely, humanitarian law.174 Under this approach, as one commentator put it, “humanitarian law is to be
172. See Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck, supra note 21, at 3–36, 46–50; W.
Michael Reisman & Douglas L. Stevick, The Applicability of International Law
Standards to United Nations Economic Sanctions Programmes, 9 EUR. J. INT’L
L. 86, 94 –95 (1998).
173. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 226,
¶ 25 (July 8) (Advisory Opinion). As explained in Parts III.A & III.C, we believe that the ICJ’s Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion is probably characterized as adopting a pure displacement or event-specific displacement approach.
See supra notes 32–35, 64–70 and accompanying text.
174. Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. ¶ 25.
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used to interpret a human rights rule, and, conversely in the
context of the conduct of hostilities, human rights law may not
be interpreted differently from humanitarian law.”175 Thus, because the right to life is articulated in the ICCPR using an ambiguous term—“arbitrarily”—the displacement and complementarity models can reach the same answer.176 But they reach
that answer in different ways: the Displacement Model applies
humanitarian law directly, whereas the Complementarity Model applies it indirectly by interpreting the ICCPR term “arbitrarily” to be defined by humanitarian law during armed conflict.
The Conflict Resolution Model would approach the problem
differently, giving effect to both legal frameworks whenever
possible and choosing one to the exclusion of the other in cases
of conflict. The Israeli Supreme Court, for example, in its opinion in the Targeted Killings Case employed an approach akin to
the event-specific displacement version of the Conflict Resolution Model, applying humanitarian law in all cases of conflict.
When considering whether a State must attempt to arrest a civilian who is directly participating in hostilities before using
lethal force against him, the High Court found a gap in the applicable humanitarian law and filled in that gap by requiring
the State to abide by the human rights law duty to attempt arrest.177 However, in cases where arrest is impracticable, the
High Court found that humanitarian law applied, permitting
the State to engage in targeted killing of civilians directly participating in hostilities as long as the attacks do not disproportionately harm other civilians.178
The Inter-American Commission has followed an approach
that tracks the specificity version of the Conflict Resolution
Model—our favored approach. In Abella, the Inter-American
Commission applied humanitarian law to Argentina’s killing of

175. Ray Murphy, United Nations Military Operations and International
Humanitarian Law: What Rules Apply to Peacekeepers?, 14 CRIM. L.F. 153,
158 (2003).
176. See Dannenbaum Memo, supra note 30, at 7 (explaining that in the
context of the right to life, the displacement and complementarity models can
converge).
177. HCJ 769/02 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Isr. v. Gov’t of Israel
[2006] (2) PD 459, ¶ 40 (Isr.), available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl-nat.nsf/
WebALL?openview (follow “Israel” hyperlink; then follow “National Case Law”
hyperlink; then follow “The Public Committee against Torture in Israel et al.
v. The Government of Israel et al., Supreme Court of Israel, 14 December
2006” hyperlink).
178. Id.
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participants in an armed attack on an army barracks,179 but it
applied human rights law to Colombia’s killing of members of
“marginal groups” engaged in mere “criminal activities.”180 The
Commission’s analysis in Abella covers nearly all of the five
factors we propose for the specificity rule of Conflict Resolution.
Regarding the wording and content of the norms, the Commission observed that applicable human rights instruments were
not “designed to regulate such situations and, thus, they contain no rules governing the means and methods of warfare.”181
In contrast, applicable rules of “humanitarian law generally afford victims of armed conflicts greater or more specific protections than do the more generally phrased guarantees in the
American Convention and other human rights instruments.”182
Nevertheless, the Commission went on to emphasize the importance of human rights law in the context of “internal armed
conflict,”183 suggesting that standards change when governments exercise greater effective control. Also relevant to the
analysis was which body of law created a “higher standard” for
the applicable right or freedom.184 Although not identical to the
permission/obligation approach we recommend, this inquiry
demonstrates similar policy considerations. Finally, with respect to factors four and five, the Commission considered commentaries, international legal precedent, and the practice of
OAS member states.185 This more nuanced approach to the
right to life ensures that human rights norms are applied without losing their substantive force, but at the same time appropriately tailors the legal rules to the armed conflict context in
which they are applied.
B. DETENTION AND THE RIGHT TO TRIAL
A second important area of conflict between human rights
law and humanitarian law concerns detention and the right to
trial. There are several interlocking conflicts between these two
bodies of law in this area. Most importantly, humanitarian law
permits States to intern POWs for the duration of hostilities
179. Abella v. Argentina, Case 11.137, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No.
55/97, OEA/Ser.L./V/II.95, doc. 7 rev. ¶ 156 (1997).
180. Colombia Report, supra note 109, ¶¶ 208, 213.
181. Abella, ¶ 158.
182. Id. ¶ 159 (emphasis added).
183. Id. ¶ 160.
184. Id. ¶¶ 164 –65.
185. See id. ¶¶ 160, 162, 166.
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and prohibits States from trying them for lawful combat activities,186 while human rights law requires all individuals deprived of their liberty to be brought to trial,187 with only limited
exceptions. Humanitarian law also permits States to intern
certain civilians without trial for security reasons,188 which
human rights law would prohibit. In addition, humanitarian
law allows certain detention-related disputes to be adjudicated
by administrative tribunals,189 while human rights law requires a judicial hearing.190 Finally, human rights law guarantees defendants the right to court-appointed counsel,191 while
humanitarian law does not.192
Turning first to human rights law, human rights instruments provide all individuals detained by the State with robust
rights to judicial review. Article 9 of the ICCPR provides that
“[a]nyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention
shall be entitled to take proceedings before a court, in order
that that court may decide without delay on the lawfulness of
his detention and order his release if the detention is not lawful.”193 In general, the “proceedings before a court” must take
the form of a criminal trial, although detention without trial is
permissible for narrow reasons pending trial, for reasons related to the detainee’s physical or mental health, and for reasons
related to controlling immigration.194 Where the proceedings
take the form of a criminal trial, accused individuals have the
right to a public hearing before an impartial tribunal, the right
to be informed of charges against them,195 the right to defend
186. See GC III, supra note 13, art. 21; Henckhaerts & Doswald-Beck, supra note 21, at 384.
187. AP I, supra note 21, art. 75(4).
188. See Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons
in Time of War, art. 42, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter GC IV].
189. See GC III, supra note 13, art. 96.
190. Henckhaerts & Doswald-Beck, supra note 21, at 355.
191. ICCPR, supra note 25, art. 9.
192. See GC III, supra note 13, art. 72 (stating that the “Protecting Power
may provide” defendants court-appointed counsel, suggesting that there is discretion within the Protecting Power).
193. ICCPR, supra note 25, art. 9.
194. See Inter-Am. Comm’n on Human Rights, Report on Terrorism and
Human Rights, ¶¶ 118, 124, OEA/Ser.L./V/II.116, doc. 5 rev. 1 corr (Oct. 22,
2002) (interpreting nearly identical provisions of the American Declaration on
Human Rights and the American Convention on Human Rights and noting the
similarity to the provisions of the ICCPR).
195. ICCPR, supra note 25, art. 14(3)(a).
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themselves,196 the right to an interpreter,197 the right to crossexamine witnesses,198 the right to be presumed innocent until
proven guilty,199 and the right to appeal.200 When hearings
cannot be public for reasons of public order, morals, or national
security, judgments must be made public, with some narrow
exceptions.201 Accused individuals also have the right “[t]o have
adequate time and facilities for the preparation of [their] defence and to communicate with counsel of [their] own choosing,”202 and they must be appointed a defender if they cannot
afford one.203 They also must be “tried without undue delay.”204
Detention under human rights law is thus focused on criminal
law enforcement, with limited exceptions for public safety and
immigration.
States’ authority to detain under humanitarian law is generally broader than under human rights law, although the
scope of that authority depends on whether the detainee is a
POW or a civilian. When members of the enemy’s armed forces
are captured, humanitarian law permits the State to intern205
them as POWs without trial for the duration of hostilities.206
However, POWs need only give their name, rank, serial number, and date of birth in response to any questioning,207 and

196. Id. art. 14(3)(d).
197. Id. art. 14(3)(f ).
198. Id. art. 14(3)(e).
199. Id. art. 14(2).
200. Id. art. 14(5).
201. Id. art. 14(1).
202. Id. art. 14(3)(b).
203. Id. art. 14(3)(d).
204. Id. art. 14(3)(c).
205. Internment is a form of deprivation of liberty distinct from and less
harsh than detention. The ICRC’s commentary to the Third Geneva Convention explains that
[t]o intern a person is to put him in a certain area or place—in the
case of prisoners of war, usually a camp—and to forbid him to leave
its limits. The concept of internment should not be confused with that
of detention. Internment involves the obligation not to leave the town,
village, or piece of land, whether or not fenced in, on which the camp
installations are situated, but it does not necessarily mean that a
prisoner of war may be confined to a cell or a room. Such confinement
may only be imposed in execution of penal or disciplinary sanctions . . . .
ICRC, COMMENTARY ON THE THIRD GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE
TREATMENT OF THE PRISONERS OF WAR 178 (Jean S. Pictet ed., 1960).
206. GC III, supra note 13, art. 21.
207. Id. art. 17.
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they must be released at the end of hostilities.208 POWs also enjoy immunity for lawful combat activities, and therefore may
not be tried for murder or similar civil crimes.209 POWs may be
punitively detained during or after hostilities only upon conviction for a war crime or for a crime committed during internment, and States must provide accused POWs with the basic
guarantees of due process.210 Where an individual’s combatant
status is unclear, a competent tribunal (not necessarily a court)
must determine whether the individual qualifies as a POW.211
Civilians, on the other hand, have rights against detention under humanitarian law that are simultaneously narrower and
broader than those of POWs. States may intern aliens within
their territory and civilians residing in occupied territory only
where “security . . . makes it absolutely necessary”212 or for
“imperative reasons of security.”213 However, unlike POWs, interned civilians are entitled to have the substantive basis for
their internment reviewed by a competent tribunal (again, not
necessarily a civilian court).214 For civilians residing in occupied territory, the penal code of the occupied State presumptively remains in place, but the occupying State may supplement that code with its own penal laws on a prospective
basis.215 Unlike lawful combatants, civilians enjoy no immunity
from ordinary penal laws, and therefore may be tried and incarcerated for murder or other crimes to the extent that they
participate in hostilities, subject to basic procedural guarantees. Those procedural guarantees, however, do not include the
right to appointed counsel,216 and the tribunal hearing the case
may be a military rather than a civilian court.217
The central conflicts between the two bodies of law surrounding detention thus concern States’ ability to intern POWs
and civilians without trial, the extent to which detention or internment must be subject to review by a court, and whether ci-

208. Id. art. 133.
209. See id. art. 70.
210. AP I, supra note 21, art. 75(4)(d); AP II, supra note 21, art. 6(2); GC
III, supra note 13, arts. 95–96, 99, 103–07.
211. GC III, supra note 13, art. 5.
212. GC IV, supra note 188, art. 42.
213. Id. art. 78.
214. Id. arts. 43, 78.
215. Id. arts. 64 –67.
216. See id. arts. 71–74.
217. Id. art. 66.
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vilians in an occupied territory are entitled to appointed counsel if tried for a crime.
The Displacement Model would resolve these conflicts by
asking simply whether or not there is an armed conflict. If an
armed conflict is present, then POWs and civilians may be interned without trial, POWs may not be tried for their lawful
combat activities, disputes around combatant status and the
basis for civilian internment may be adjudicated by administrative or military tribunals, and civilians in occupied territory
need not be provided with appointed counsel. If no armed conflict is present, then all detainees must be brought to trial before a court (subject to the exceptions for public safety and immigration), there is no immunity for combat activities, and
criminal defendants must be afforded appointed counsel.
The Complementarity Model would proceed by attempting
to reconcile the requirements of the two bodies of law. With regard to appointed counsel, since humanitarian law does not expressly provide that occupying States have no obligation to
provide appointed counsel, this model would be expected to resolve that conflict by requiring the appointment of counsel.
Similarly, no provision of humanitarian law would be violated
by having combatant status disputes and civilian internee cases heard by a judicial instead of an administrative tribunal, as
human rights law would require.218 The Complementarity
Model, however, cannot effectively address the truly irreconcilable conflict over whether or not States must bring all detained
individuals to trial. Humanitarian law provides that POWs

218. The Inter-American Commission suggested its support for this approach in the executive summary to its Report on Terrorism and Human
Rights:
Notwithstanding the existence of these specific rules and mechanisms
governing the detention of persons in situations of armed conflict,
there may be circumstances in which the supervising mechanisms
under international humanitarian law are not properly engaged or
available, or where the detention or internment of civilians or combatants continue [sic] for a prolonged period. Where this occurs, the
regulations and procedures under international humanitarian law
may prove inadequate to properly safeguard the minimum standards
of treatment of detainees, and the supervisory mechanisms under international human rights law, including habeas corpus and amparo
remedies, may necessarily supercede international humanitarian law
in order to ensure at all times effective protection of the fundamental
rights of detainees.
Report on Terrorism and Human Rights Executive Summary, supra note 194,
¶ 14.
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cannot be brought to trial,219 but human rights law provides
that they must;220 humanitarian law provides that civilians
may be interned for security reasons,221 but human rights law
provides that they may not.222 These rules cannot be easily
harmonized.
The Conflict Resolution Model would take the same approach as the Complementarity Model in cases where human
rights law and humanitarian law are in a relationship of interpretation, and would then resolve cases of true conflict according to the chosen rule of conflict resolution. Accordingly, the
Conflict Resolution Model would, like the Complementarity
Model, provide appointed counsel and would adjudicate all disputes over the basis for detention before judicial rather than
administrative tribunals. As for internment of POWs and civilians without trial, the event-specific displacement version of
the Conflict Resolution Model would apply humanitarian law
and allow internment without trial. The reverse event-specific
displacement model—which some tribunals have followed for
jurisdictional reasons—would instead apply human rights law
and demand that all detainees be brought to trial. Finally, the
specificity version of the Conflict Resolution Model would almost certainly turn to humanitarian law as the more specific
law governing captured enemy combatants, based on an assessment of the wording and content of the norms, the nature
of the norms in question, the level of control exercised by the
State, expressions of intent by parties to relevant treaties, and
state practice. After all, humanitarian law has numerous detailed provisions on the internment of POWs that both expand
and restrain state power relative to the peacetime baseline, and
the history of state practice applying these rules is sufficiently
robust to render them binding as customary international
law.223 Detention thus provides the clearest demonstration of
the importance of contextual assessment of human rights and
humanitarian law, which only the specificity rule version of the
Conflict Resolution Model permits.

219. ICRC, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, supra note
21, at 384.
220. See ICCPR, supra note 25, art. 9(3).
221. GC IV, supra note 188, art. 42.
222. See ICCPR, supra note 25, art. 9.
223. See ICRC, supra note 21, at 344 –52.
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C. WOMEN’S RIGHTS
A third potential area of conflict between the two bodies of
law concerns women’s rights. The leading human rights convention on women’s rights, the Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), obligates state parties (which do not presently include the United
States) to “take all appropriate measures” to eliminate discrimination and guarantee legal, social, and economic equality to
women.224 Humanitarian law, however, focuses more narrowly
on protecting women from sexual assault and protecting them
in their role as mothers. While the protections under the two
bodies of law are largely compatible, conflicts may arise during
armed conflict due to an occupying State’s obligation under
humanitarian law to preserve local law and States’ diminished
capacity to guarantee the degree of social equality envisioned
by human rights law in the context of war.
Human rights law broadly provides for non-discrimination
and equality for women in all fields of society. CEDAW requires
States to “accord to women equality with men before the
law,”225 and to “take all appropriate measures” to eliminate discrimination and ensure equal rights to vote, to participate in
government, to participate in public associations and organizations,226 to education,227 to healthcare,228 to employment and
economic opportunity,229 and to the benefits and burdens of
marriage.230 CEDAW does not explicitly prohibit violence
against women, but States may have an obligation to prevent
violence against women as a matter of customary human rights
law.231 While CEDAW has no derogation provision, the rights
therein are generally articulated at a relatively high level of
abstraction—for example, Article 12 provides that “State Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in the field of health care in order to ensure, on a basis of equality of men and women, access to health
224. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 [hereinafter CEDAW].
225. Id. art. 15.
226. Id. arts. 7–8.
227. Id. art. 10.
228. Id. art. 12.
229. Id. arts. 11, 13–14.
230. Id. art. 16.
231. See BONITA MEYERSFELD, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND INTERNATIONAL
LAW 6 (2010).
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care services.”232 Moreover, the language of “tak[ing] all appropriate measures” suggests that States have some leeway in exactly how they implement their obligations.233
Under humanitarian law, women enjoy the same protections that apply to all persons during armed conflict, but there
are also a number of provisions that protect women exclusively.234 Under the Geneva Conventions, women must “be treated
with all consideration due to their sex.”235 This entails a right
against discrimination—under the Third Geneva Convention,
for example, female prisoners of war must “in all cases benefit
by treatment as favourable as that granted to men”236 and may
not be sentenced to a more severe punishment than male members of the detaining armed forces in similar circumstances.237
Beyond non-discrimination, humanitarian law also has provisions giving women special protection due to their reproductive
roles and vulnerability to sexual assault.238 Numerous articles
in the Fourth Geneva Convention and Additional Protocol I expressly single out mothers and pregnant women for special
consideration and protection.239 The Fourth Geneva Convention
and Additional Protocol I also provide that women must be protected from sexual violence, including rape, assault, and forced
prostitution.240 Female POWs also are given special consideration regarding privacy: they may not be housed with or
searched by men.241 In addition, even beyond the Geneva Conventions, the U.N. Security Council recently has adopted a se232. CEDAW, supra note 224, art. 12.
233. Id.
234. See ICRC, ANNEX TO THE GUIDANCE DOCUMENT: GENERAL AND SPECIFIC PROTECTION OF WOMEN UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW
(2004), available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/category,LEGAL,ICRC,,,
46e94378d,0.html (discussing provisions protecting women throughout various
issues).
235. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded and the Sick in Armed Forces in the Field art. 12(4), Aug. 12, 1949,
75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of
Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12,
1949, art. 12(4), 75 U.N.T.S. 85.
236. GC III, supra note 13, art. 14.
237. Id. art. 88(3).
238. See Judith G. Gardam, Women, Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law, 324 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 421, 421–22 (1998).
239. AP I, supra note 21, arts. 8(a), 70(1), 76; GC IV, supra note 188, arts.
14, 16, 23, 50, 91.
240. AP I, supra note 21, art. 76; GC IV, supra note 188, art. 27.
241. AP I, supra note 21, art. 75(5); AP II, supra note 21, art. 5(2)(a); GC
III, supra note 13, arts. 25, 29, 97; GC IV, supra note 188, arts. 76, 85, 97, 124.
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ries of resolutions aimed at protecting women from genderbased violence during armed conflict and at providing women a
role in conflict-resolution and peace-making.242 At the same
time, however, the Fourth Geneva Convention establishes that
occupying States have an obligation to preserve the penal law
of the occupied State and to allow local tribunals to continue to
operate.243
The differences between the two bodies of law regarding
women’s rights thus center around (1) the broader scope of protection that human rights law provides compared to humanitarian law, (2) occupying States’ obligation under humanitarian
law to preserve local law and local courts even if they discriminate against women in contravention of human rights law, and
(3) States’ diminished capacity to guarantee the kind of social
equality envisioned by human rights law during armed conflict.
The Displacement Model would resolve each of these conflicts in favor of humanitarian law in all cases during armed
conflict. While in an armed conflict situation, the broader protections of human rights law would not apply, even when they
are not incompatible with the narrower protections afforded by
humanitarian law. Similarly, occupying States’ obligation to
preserve local law and local courts would supersede any human
rights law duty of nondiscrimination, and any diminished State
capacity to guarantee equality would be moot, since there
would be no human rights law obligation to take appropriate
measures to ensure social equality.
The Complementarity Model would attempt to harmonize a
State’s obligations under the two bodies of law. Because the
broader protections afforded by human rights law are not incompatible with humanitarian law’s narrower and more specific protections, this approach would apply both sets of obligations. As for occupying States’ duty to protect local law and
local courts, the complementarity approach might proceed by
noting that CEDAW only obligates States to “take all appropriate measures” to guarantee equality;244 accordingly, measures
that would violate the Geneva Conventions could be considered
not to be “appropriate,” and therefore not mandatory under
CEDAW. The complementarity approach might also exploit the
242. See S.C. Res. 1888, ¶¶ 3, 18, 26, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1888 (Sept. 30,
2009); S.C. Res. 1820, ¶¶ 3, 12, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1820 (June 19, 2008); S.C.
Res. 1325, ¶¶ 2, 10, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1325 (Oct. 31, 2000).
243. GC IV, supra note 188, art. 64.
244. CEDAW, supra note 224.
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leeway implicit in the word “appropriate” in addressing States’
diminished capacity in wartime, concluding that CEDAW only
requires States to eliminate discrimination against women to
the extent that they have the effective capacity to do so.
Such an approach, in which the two bodies of law are taken
to be reconcilable, would align with developments in the two
bodies of law over the past two decades. Humanitarian law has
come to encompass more protections for women’s rights, and
human rights law has begun to acknowledge the risk that
women face from gender-based violence both in and out of conflict settings.245 The Vienna Declaration adopted by the U.N.
World Conference on Human Rights recognized the fundamental convergence between these two bodies of law, declaring that
“violations of the human rights of women in situations of armed
conflict are violations of the fundamental principles of human
rights and humanitarian law.”246
The Conflict Resolution Model would reach the same ultimate conclusions as the Complementarity Model in this area of
law. After all, the Conflict Resolution Model only requires resort to a rule of conflict resolution when there is a true conflict
between the relevant human rights law and humanitarian law.
In this case, human rights law and humanitarian law are in a
relationship of interpretation, and thus it is possible to apply
each without excluding the validity and applicability of the other. The overlap between the Complementarity and Conflict
Resolution Models in the area of women’s rights illustrates
that, to the extent that human rights law and humanitarian
law norms do not conflict, the Conflict Resolution Model operates precisely the same as the Complementarily Model.

245. The U.N. General Assembly adopted the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women in 1993 which “expressly recognized that
women in situations of armed conflict are especially vulnerable to violence.”
Gardam, supra note 238, at 426. The U.N. has also appointed a Special Rapporteur on violence against women “with a mandate covering situations of
armed conflict . . . . The Fourth U.N. World Conference on Women, held in Beijing in 1995, recognized the seriousness of armed conflict and its impact on the
lives of women.” Id. at 427.
246. Id. at 426 (quoting World Conference on Human Rights, June 14 –25,
1993, Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 157/24
(Part I) (Oct. 13, 1993)).
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D. THE RIGHTS TO FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, ASSOCIATION, AND
MOVEMENT
The rights to free expression, association, and movement
provide a fourth area of potential conflict between human
rights law and humanitarian law. While conflicts may arise,
however, the human rights law and humanitarian law relating
to these rights are largely reconcilable due to limitations on the
scope of the rights under the ICCPR and due to the Fourth Geneva Convention’s baseline concern for the fundamental rights
of civilians residing in occupied territories.
The rights to free expression, association, and movement
are all protected in the ICCPR. Article 19 guarantees “the right
to hold opinions without interference” and “the right to freedom
of expression”;247 Article 21 guarantees “the right of peaceful
assembly”;248 and Article 12 guarantees “the right to liberty of
movement and freedom to choose [one’s] residence.”249 These
rights, however, are not absolute under the ICCPR. Each may
be restricted in the interest of “national security, public order
(ordre public), public health or morals or the rights and freedoms of others.”250
Humanitarian law has a number of provisions that touch
on the rights to free expression, association, and movement.
Turning first to free expression, humanitarian law’s definition
of a “military objective”—“those objects which by their nature,
location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or
neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a
definite military advantage”251—is clearly broad enough to encompass media and communications infrastructure, rendering
important means of expression legitimate targets of military
attack. In addition, the Fourth Geneva Convention permits an
occupying State to supplement local law with its own penal
laws to the extent that they are “essential to enable the Occupying Power . . . to maintain the orderly government of the territory[] and to ensure the security of the Occupying Power . . . .”252 This authority does not extend so far as to allow an
247. ICCPR, supra note 25, art. 19(1)–(2).
248. Id. art. 21.
249. Id. art. 21(1).
250. Id. art. 12(3). Articles 19 and 21 contain nearly identical limitations,
with only slight variations in phrasing. Id. arts. 19(3)(b), 21.
251. AP I, supra note 21, art. 52(2).
252. GC IV, supra note 188, art. 64.
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occupying State to punish “opinions expressed before the occupation,”253 but that very limitation suggests that an occupying
State may punish opinions expressed during the occupation.
This same power to establish new laws also leaves room for an
occupying State to restrict the right of free association and assembly. As for the right to freedom of movement, the commentary on Article 27 of the Fourth Geneva Convention explicitly
recognizes that “the freedom of movement of civilians of enemy
nationality may certainly be restricted, or even temporarily
suppressed, if circumstances so require.”254 That same commentary notes, however, that “the regulations concerning occupation and those concerning civilian aliens in the territory of a
Party to the conflict are based on the idea of the personal freedom of civilians remaining in general unimpaired.”255 Thus, to
varying degrees, humanitarian law explicitly or implicitly permits States to restrict the rights of freedom of expression, association, and movement recognized by human rights law during
armed conflict.
The Displacement Model would resolve these conflicts by
allowing States to restrict those rights to the full extent allowed by humanitarian law, with human rights law completely
displaced within the zone of armed conflict.
The Complementarity Model would likely proceed by noting that each of these rights is limited in human rights law itself by considerations of national security and public order,
considerations that are unquestionably triggered during armed
conflict. Similarly, the commentary to Article 27 of the Fourth
Geneva Convention demonstrates that while humanitarian law
permits these rights to be restricted, it starts from the baseline
proposition that they should be honored where possible.256 In
this way, the two bodies of law can be interpreted so that their
respective norms are compatible and mutually reinforcing.
As with women’s rights, the Conflict Resolution Model
would follow the same approach as the Complementarity Model
in this area of law. The relevant norms are in a relationship of
interpretation rather than a relationship of conflict, therefore
the Conflict Resolution Model need not employ a rule of conflict
resolution here.
253. Id. art. 70.
254. ICRC, COMMENTARY, IV GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS IN TIMES OF WAR 202 (Jean S. Pictet ed., 1958).
255. Id.
256. GC IV, supra note 188, art. 21.
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Together, these four examples demonstrate how the various models outlined in Part II operate when human rights law
and humanitarian law have different or conflicting norms. In
each case, the Displacement Model offers a straightforward but
unnuanced solution—one that always requires human rights
law to defer to humanitarian law, even in cases where human
rights law is better tailored to the situation or where human
rights law might productively inform humanitarian law. The
Complementarity Model, by contrast, gives full effect to both
bodies of law. But it is incapable of addressing irreconcilable
conflicts between the two bodies of law—particularly regarding
the right to life and detention and right to trial—and thus offers an incomplete solution. The Conflict Resolution Model—in
particular the version that employs the specificity test to resolve conflicts—has the strengths of the Complementarity
Model without its weaknesses. It gives full effect to both bodies
of law, using both to inform one another wherever possible. But
it offers a tool for resolving direct conflicts between the two
bodies of law—guiding decision makers to turn to the body of
law most specific to the particular event at hand, a determination informed by five key factors.
CONCLUSION
In the period following the attacks of September 11, 2001,
the United States, United Kingdom, and other States committed increasing numbers of troops abroad in an effort to eliminate the threat of terrorist attacks by al Qaeda and its affiliates. With that war now in its second decade, a host of new
legal questions has emerged. Key among them is what law these States should turn to in determining the legality of their
conduct. Does human rights law impose obligations on the actions of States outside their own territory? If so, what happens
when those obligations conflict with the legal rules as defined
by humanitarian law? Must prisoners of war be tried (as required for detainees under human rights law) or may they only
be held to the end of hostilities (as required under humanitarian law)? Is a State obligated to attempt to arrest a civilian directly participating in hostilities or may the State use lethal
force against him without first attempting arrest? The answer
to these questions depends on which body of law—human
rights law or humanitarian law—applies.
This Article has outlined three separate models for answering this question. Under the Displacement Model, humanitari-
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an law displaces human rights law entirely in the zone of
armed conflict; under the Complementarity Model, the two bodies of law both apply in armed conflict and are interpreted
harmoniously; and under the Conflict Resolution Model, the
two bodies of law may both apply in armed conflict but when
that is not possible, there are three possible decision rules for
choosing between the two bodies of law. Of the three possible
rules, we argue for the specificity rule, in which the choice between applying human rights law or humanitarian law depends on which is deemed most specific to the given situation.
This approach allows for highly nuanced determinations as to
whether particular conduct in the context of armed conflict may
be governed best by human rights law or humanitarian law
when the two conflict, while also recognizing—as the Complementarity Model does—that both bodies of law may productively inform each other in the many situations in which they do
not conflict. The approach is also consistent with the jurisprudence of a range of international tribunals and the positions of
U.S. allies.
This approach recognizes that humanitarian law is often—
but not always—the body of law most specifically tailored to
armed conflict situations. Merely because a given situation occurs within an armed conflict zone does not necessarily preclude the application of human rights law. Indeed, human
rights law offers an alternative toolset that may be better tailored to a given situation. At the same time, this approach does
not pretend that all conflicts between the two bodies of law can
be resolved through a process of interpretation. Some conflicts
are irreconcilable, and it is necessary to have an effective tool
for resolving those conflicts.
Humanitarian law and human rights law regulate similar
conduct and are both rooted in an effort to safeguard human
dignity. Jakob Kellenberger, President of the International
Committee of the Red Cross once wrote, “[l]ike international
human rights, international humanitarian law aims, among
other things, to protect human life, prevent and punish torture
and ensure fundamental judicial guarantees to persons subject
to criminal process.”257 The specificity-based Conflict Resolution Model, which gives maximum effect to both bodies of law
where possible but offers a balanced approach for choosing between them when necessary, offers the most effective available
257. Kellenberger, supra note 42.

1944

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[96:1883

legal tool for protecting that fundamental human dignity.

